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25 May–A–MW–17–2–Gallagher (Int.Evand) 
COURT V,  CASE XII 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: You may have the same privileges and rights with 
respect to the documents that have been heretofore indicated. 
 
 DR. FRITSCH: I merely have one request, Your Honor. In my opening 
statement I made a motion to strike Counts I and IV of the Indictment. I 
would now like to ask the Tribunal to rule on this motion. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: If you desire a ruling on that motion at this time, 
inasmuch as the testimony is now in,the [sic] motion will be overruled, 
because that is one of the essential questions that will have to be 
determined when the opinion is written. If there is no proof of these, 
why, of course, then those Counts have not been substantiated, but at 
this time the motion will be overruled. 
 
 DR. MECKEL: Dr. Meckel for the defendant, Admiral Schniewind. 
 
 May it please the Tribunal: 
 
 The IMT trial against the so-called chief war criminals which 
opened the various Nuernberg [sic] trials was meant to establish who were 
the primarily guilty persons responsible for the great international 
disaster of World War II, and the crimes committed in connection 
therewith. In that trial, two admirals of the German Navy were also 
sentenced, the Grand Admirals Raeder and Doenitz. 
 
 I consider the verdict particularly worthy of notice, as the IMT 
did not convict the two admirals on the most incriminating counts, i.e. 
submarine warfare. 
 
 Based on the evidence submitted by the defense, the IMT found that, 
although some of the measures ordered in naval warfare did constitute 
[first t typed over an i] violations of ratified pacts, they could 
however, not be interpreted as violations of international law which 
would be punishable, as in practice all nations waging naval war, 
including England and the United States, acted exactly as the Germans 
did. The direction of German naval operations, i.e. the actual task and 
sphere of responsibility of the German admirals has thus been vindicated 
by the verdict of the highest tribunal of the victor nations. In spite of 
this however, the two chiefs 
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of naval operations were sentenced, namely for their participation in as 
well as preparation and direction of the planning for aggressive war, 
with every nation which claimed to have a disciplined Government the 
decision of peace or war is one of a political nature, a decision made by 
the head of the state and the government and not by the soldiers. 
 
 This viewpoint was also held at that time by officers of other 
countries, who opposed an opinion according to which military leaders 
were considered cooresponsible [sic] and convicted for acts which were 
outside their scope of duties, and which they had not authority to decide 
upon. 
 
 On the other hand, the view was held that a commander-in-chief who 
represents his brand of the Wehrmacht with the political leadership also 
had a certain political responsibility, because he, in his capacity as 
representative of the armed forces under his command, should have been 
able to exert some measure of influence upon the political leadership and 
should have made a point of doing so. 
 
 The justification of this particular opinion is a moot point, 
especially when one considers the conditions prevailing in Germany at 
that time, but this argumentation does not hold water if it is used for 
calling other military leaders to account, who, without ever having been 
close to exercise any political influence, were solely concerned with 
their military duties. 
 
 If now, after two years, the prosecution in the last of the 
Nuernberg [sic] trials once again demands that an admiral be convicted 
because he was allegedly corresponsible [sic] for aggressive war, it by 
far transgresses the boundaries of a thesis, which at least theoretically 
justifies the charge of corresponsibility [sic], and enters the realm of 
the boundless. If, in doing so, the prosecution refers to the verdict 
against the two Grand Admirals in order to substantiate its demands it 
overlooks completely – either deliberately or unintentionally – that the 
prerequisites were entirely different. 
 
 The prosecution attempted to stress quite especially the importance 
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of Admiral Schniewind's official positions and the part which he 
allegedly played after World War I in the German Navy. I do not know 
whether certain exaggerations are the result of erroneous conclusions, or 
whether they were seriously meant to substantiate the indictment. I am 
particularly in the dark as to from what time on the prosecution claims 
the defendant to be guilty of criminal acts by his participation in 
preparing aggressive war. According to addendum A [?] of the indictment, 
it has been alleged that the defendants committed crimes against the 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as early as 1919. In 1919, 
the former Lieutenant commander Schniewind was a prisoner of war in the 
hands of the British, and in 1920 he as the skipper of a mine sweeper. 
 
 Furthermore, in its opening statement, the prosecution claims that 
in the years after the seizure of power by the Nazis, the admiral was one 
of the Navy's officers with the highest seniority of service and rank. In 
actual fact, however, in 1933 he was commander and commanding officer of 
a cruiser, i.e. a naval unit which at best is comparable to a regiment, 
[sic] Even in 1938, he was nothing but one of the youngest rear-admirals 
of the Navy. 
 
 The defense does not intend to do the same and, on its part, 
attempt to diminish the position and importance of the admiral. However, 
I deem it right and necessary at first to demonstrate the admiral's 
actual position. For, I think it is unfair to exaggerate the importance 
and tasks of a person and to ascribe to him knowledge and information 
derived from such fictitious importance, which he could not have possibly 
had, and furthermore to expect him of having passed decisions which he 
could not have possible passed, as well as having acted in a manner which 
was altogether an impossibility.  
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The prosecution considers the rearmement [sic] program of the German 
Wehrmacht as the first step towards the preparation for aggressive war, 
and, accordingly, considers any participation in this rearmement [sic] 
drive criminal and thus punishable. 
 
 Or in other words, the prosecution wants to construe the fact that 
a person had cognizance of armament measures in violation of treaties, as 
being tantamount to having [v and i typed over i and indiscernible 
letter] knowledge of intentions to wage aggressive war. Much has been 
said in this trial to refute this assertion. 
 
 The documents concerning the rearmement [sic] program as it 
affected the Navy, which have been submitted by the prosecution have no 
connection whatsoever with the admiral, not [sic] do they prove his 
participation or, altogether that he had knowledge of armament measures 
which violated international agreements.  
 
 On the whole, the indictment has been drafted in such general terms 
that it was really difficult to find any clearly defined charges against 
the admiral. A considerable part of the evidence submitted consists of 
military orders which the admiral received, forwarded, or drafted. When 
this evidence was submitted, hardly any other comment was made, except 
"Initialed by Schniewind" or "signed by Schniewind". I cannot conceivable 
[sic] see how the admiral's activity of receiving drafting, or passing on 
of orders can be called an incriminating face [sic], for even the 
prosecution states that this is part of the duties of officers in all the 
armies in the world. 
 
 However, the prosecution seems to be under the impression that, by 
submitting these orders, it has proved the admirals knowledge, derived 
from these orders, or the illegal nature of these planned wars, which 
were then waged at a later date. 
 
 A military order or an operational plan are not a diplomatic note, 
and if, occasionally, somewhat aggressive words were used in such orders 
and directives it has to be considered that these order [sic] were 
drafted for the case that war did break out, and that the recipient of 
such orders, 
25 May–A–JP–18–2–Goldberg (Int. Evand) 
Court V  Case XII 
 
who was to prepare himself mentally as well as actuating material 
preparations for just a case was also expected to imagine any given 
situation which would exist if war broke out. Everything leading up to 
this point is outside the military sphere, and in the majority of cases 
it can be assumed that all such matters are far removed from any 
influence a soldier could possibly expect. The concept of aggressive war 
itself, which has become the basis in all these trials, is unknown to the 
soldierely [sic] mind per se, at least in so far as it refers to the 
legalistic concept. Whether a war is waged assdefensive [sic] or 
offensive war depends on totally different conditions than the fact that 
a war can be characterized as an aggressive or defensive war. Even a 
defensive war may be conducted by practicing offensive tactics. It is a 
fact though, that the legal minds of all counties have argued for many 
decades how the concept aggressive war could be defined. All proposals 
that have been advanced to elucidate this concept and tofix [sic] it once 
for all were never unanimously approved. If, for example, we would accept 
the definition that was put forth during the 1933 disarmament conference, 
we could even arrive at the conclusion that the war which started on 1 
September 1939 was an aggressive war launched by Poland [smudge] for even 
on 23 and 24 August, German airplanes which flew outside Polish territory 
were shot at by Polish batteries. In view of such an involved situation, 
is it fair to expect a soldier to show so much distrust toward his own 
government that he examines an ordered preparation for mobilization, or 
has it examined, whether or not it might lead to an aggressive war, from 
a legalistic point of view? 
 
 Nevertheless, the prosecution does claim that they can prove beyond 
any doubt the knowledge of the unlawful character of the wars with which 
we are concerned. In order to convince the court of its contention, the 
prosecution has sketched an overall picture of the events of the past 20 
years. I claim that this picture is wrong from an objective point of 
view. In order to illustrate those events, the prosecution has submitted 
document [sic] partly taken from their context, newspaper reports and 
other material if 
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they served its purpose; however, it did not mention other important 
documents which would have been absolutely necessary in order to present 
an actual and true picture. The whole picture. The whole picture deviates 
from historic facts. 
 
 However, by selecting documents, two totally different versions can 
be presented is clearly shown by the documents and publications [c typed 
over s] which some months [t typed over g] ago were published both by the 
Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. All of the 
published documents come from the same collection of documentary 
material, i.e. from captured German archives, from which, incidentally, 
also the evidence of the prosecution has been taken. 
 
 With those publications, the United States intend to prove that the 
Soviet Union's assistance and active support made it possible for Germany 
to wage aggressive war. 
 
 The Soviet Union's publications, on the other hand, are meant to 
show and to prove that the Western Powers' "Policy of Appeasement" 
encouraged Hitler in his aggressive course, and made it possible for him 
to launch his aggressive acts. 
 
 I am of the opinion that those two assertions are at least just as 
diametrically opposed to one another, as in our case the claims and 
counterclaim [type fades away] of the prosecution and the defense. Both 
in this as in the afore-mentioned case, a true picture can only be gained 
if a critical person knows not only the material selected by one party, 
but is also familiar with the whole material. 
 
 Furthermore, in its presentation the prosecution has the advantage 
of the fact that the picture of events drawn by it has been disseminated 
for years in a similar form and with all means of modern propaganda 
technique, and has been thoroughly drummed into the minds of world public 
opinion. 
 
 Comparing the essays and books which, in the years after World War 
I, deal with the war guilt, both those that appeared in 1920 and 1921 as 
well as in the ‘thirties,' it can be seen that opinions concerning the  
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guilt question changed quote materially in the Versailles Treaty, Germany 
was called the country solely responsible for World War I. 
 
 In 1929 Emil L u d w i g [sic], who certainly is above suspicion to 
be favorable inclibed [sic] towards the Kaiser's Germany, wrote, in the 
preface to his book "July 1914", the following in exactly the same words 
as quoted here: "All of Europe must share the guilt for the war. That has 
been definitely established by the "research work" in all the countries. 
Germany's sole guilt and Germany's innocence are fairy-tales both on this 
and the opposite banks of the Rhine. Which country wanted the war? Let us 
couch our questions in different terms: What circles in all the countries 
wanted the war, facilitated its coming about, or started it? 
 
 If instead of applying a horizontal yardstick right across Europe, 
a vertical measuring rod probes all classes of society, the following 
facts emerge: The whole blame can be put squarely on all the cabiners 
[sic], yet, conversely, Europe's masses were completely and totally 
innocent." 
 
 Once more, the German people were defeated in a World War, and 
again allegation [sic] were made already during the war that Germany was 
solely responsible for the war. 
 
 I will add something here: The attempt must not be made to justify 
these things but I think that it is extremely difficult, in a period 
immediately after a war, to assess and evaluate correctly and thoroughly, 
in the light of history, all the events and developments, when, in its 
wake, wrath, vindictiveness, acrimony and politically twisted tendencies 
pervade the minds of people. I am certain of the impossibility to act in 
such a way when all, even highly confidential, secret documents, are 
available to one party, while the archives remain closed for the other 
side. 
 
 However, I do not want to attempt the impossible here, i.e. to 
substitute the prosecution's version by the correct one, especially as 
this goes beyond the scope of my work. Whatever might have been the 
actual and true course of events and their backgrounds, I am sure that 
the defendants had a different conception at that time, because their 
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knowledge and ideas were formed on the basis of entirely different 
documents and sources. Also, many facts which are new [e typed over o] 
universally known were not known to the defendants at that time. 
Therefore, the picture sketched by the prosecution is subjectively false, 
to say the least. 
 
 Consequently. [sic] I am forced to correct this picture, at any 
rate in so far as it concerns the impression Admiral S c h n i e w i n d 
[sic] was bound to have had of events and developments at that time. The 
prosecution version creates the impression that the tension between 
Poland and Germany did not commence [c typed over d] until the years 
immediately preceding 1939 and was, in the most essential points, ignited 
by Germany propaganda moves and conceived in order to establish the 
necessary outward precedent to justify the acquisition of foreign 
territory by forces of arms, which was the dream of the National 
Socialist leaders and enhanced by the warlike appetites of the 
militaristically minded officers. The prosecution takes pains to avoid, 
however, even hinting at the actual situation in those controversial 
border regions in the years after World War I, and to make any mention at 
all regarding its development in the subsequent decade, although it 
certainly does not economize in using background material from that 
period. 
 
 However, matters are by no means as clear and sefl-evident [sic] as 
the prosecution would like to make them. I would like to try elaborating 
on this as briefly as possible. 
 
 I can assume that the German-Polish borders as fixed in the 
Versailles Treaty are known. The so-called "Polish Corridor" was created, 
and the population living therein was just as little consulted as the 
people in the Province of Posen. Unfortunately, the principle of the 
right of self-determination of the nations, which had just been 
announced, did not apply to Germany. East Prussia was severed from the 
Reich and became an island surrounded by Polish and Lithuanian territory. 
Even at an earlier date, the well known Polish nationalist D m o w s k i 
[sic] commented on this in a memorandum to W i l s o n [sic] of 8 October 
1918. 
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"If East Prussia is to remain connected with the other German 
territories, Polish West Prussia too should remain in the hands if [sic] 
Germany. If East Prussia, as a separate German [slash through G] 
possession and disconnected from the bulk of the country by interposing 
Polish territory, does remain in the hands of Germany it is bound to 
become a constant trouble spot between Poland and Germany, which latter 
country will continuously endeavor to reinstate a connection at the 
expense of Poland. If Poland is to become a really free nation, 
independent of the Germans, there are only two solutions to the East 
Prussian problem: either the Province of Koenigsberg, that is, that part 
of East Prussia where the population speaks the German language, should 
[s typed over w] be merged with the Polish state on the basis of an 
autonomous status, or it will have to become a small and independent 
republic, linked with Poland by a customs union." 
 
The Polish nationalist leader himself admits here that for any length of 
time the corridor would mean a thorn in the flesh of Germany, a situation 
which did not present an alternative. Thus, right from the outset the 
German-Polish relations were already overshadowed by an untenable 
situation. 
 
 Only there where Polish desires for allocation of territory at the 
expense of Germany would exceed all ressonable [sic] standards, it was 
agreed that a plebiscite be taken. It is true, the purely German city of 
Danzig, which the negotiators where reluctant to conceed [sic] to Poland, 
was torn away from the Reich and itransformed [sic] into an independent 
"free city" without a plebiscite. Thus, on 11 June 1920 a plebiscite took 
place in these parts of East Prussia which, under the supervision of the 
allies, was conducted and which resulted in a majority vote of from 93 to 
97 percent for Germany. In spite of this incontestable result, three 
villages in the Osterode District as well as five villagesiin [sic] the 
Marienwerder District were incorporated into Poland. 
 
 The treatment of Upper Silesia constitutes a particularly sad 
chapter. After protracted negotiations, in which Polish requests were 
constantly backed up by France, a plebiscite was fixed for Upper Silesia, 
which province the Poles had claimed in its entirety. On 20 March 1921, 
the Upper Silesian people irrevocably decided in favor of remaining 
Germans. Out of 1, 186, 758 [sic] votes, 709,393 were cast for Germany, 
and only 479,365 for Poland. This overwhelming confession of loyalty to 
Germany, however, did not deter the Poles from pursuing their original 
aims. At the 
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beginning of May 1920, the Polish plebiscite commissar Woiczech Korfanty, 
who had been appointed by order of the allied powers for the mandatory 
plebicite [sic] in Upper Silesia, and who was assured of the backing of 
the French General Le Rond, unleased [sic] the so-called first Polish 
insurgents, which resulted in a tremendous wave of persecutions against 
everything German right under the very eyes of the French. Italian 
occupation troops, who refused to connive at those machinations [sic] 
suffered more than 300 fatalities during the fight against the 
insurgents. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: At this time we will take our afternoon recess. 
 
 THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess until 1515. 
 
 (A recess was taken.) 
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 THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
 DR. SURHOLT: Dr. Surholt, representing General Reinecke.  
 
 Your Honor, I would ask the Tribunal to excuse my client for 
tomorrow and the day after tomorrow from attending these sessions in 
order to prepare his defense. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: He may be excused. The record will so show. 
 
 DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Rauschenbach representing defendant Woehler. 
 
 Your Honor, I would also ask the Tribunal to excuse the defendant 
Woehler from attending court sessions on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday 
in order to prepare his defense. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: He may be excused. The record will show. 
 
 DR. MECKEL: 
 
 This outrageous procedure, induced Lloyd George on 13 May 1921 to 
make the following statements in the British House of Commons: 
 
"The Allied Commission unanimously decided that the parts which had cast 
an overwhelming vote for Poland, were to be ceded to the Poles. Right, 
now, however, the Poles have staged an insurgence and put the allies 
before a fait accompli, [sic] This step was a complete break with the 
Versailles Peace Treaty. If we do not deal with the situation squarely 
and fairly, this will result in ominous consequences for the peace in 
Europe. If Poland should be permitted to overrun this province, it really 
would mean trouble. In that event, Germany would have a right to say to 
the allies: ‘You have forced us to abide by our promise but what indeed 
did you do to make good your promises?' For us it is not only a question 
of honor but also of security when we show that we abide by treaty 
obligations, quite conceivably happen [sic] that somebody said, so what, 
they are only Germans! But these people, too, have a right to claim 
everything that has been conceded to them based on treaty agreements. 
That the Poles 
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should be permitted to take away Upper Silesia in complete disregard of 
the peace treaty, and that the Germans should not have the right to 
defend aprovince [sic] which has been theirs for the past 200 years, and 
which for 600 years certainly was anything else but Polish, would be an 
ignominous [sic] notion and unworthy of every country's honor." 
 
On 12 May 1921 the German self-defense formations, fighting under 
ineffable odds, succeeded in recapturing the Anna Mountain in Upper 
Silesia, as well as in regaining other territories. When further German 
successes were imminent, the French occupation troops demanded a truce 
which was approved. During the session of the Supreme Allied Council, 
Lloyd George put forth the demand that the industrial area was not to be 
divided. However, when an agreement could not be reached there, a league 
of nation commission was empowered to reach a decision; this commission, 
consisted of one Chinese, Belgian, Czech, Brazilain [sic], and Spanish 
representative each. 
 
The commission then decided that two-fifths of the industrial areas was 
to be ceded to Poland. Contrary to the incontestable result of the 
plebiscite, Germany lost her, in the age of the right of self-
determination for all nations, 321,342 hectars [sic] with 22 zinc 
foundries and 11 zinc and lead pits. Of 37 blast furnaces, Germany lost 
23; of 67 coal mines, 53; of 14 iron milling plants, 9; and of 25 steel 
and iron foundries, 15. So innately inept, so absolutely contrary to all 
conceptions of sound economic thinking is this border demarcation in 
favor of Poland, that even the planners who conceived the creation of 
this European boundary, which is the most inadequate one next to the 
Polish corridor, themselves voiced the opinion that the torn and cut up 
Province of Upper Silesia wouldnot [sic] be able to exist in this shape. 
Therefore, they demanded a special agreement. On 15 May 1922 an agreement 
was signed in Geneva which 
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with the 606 articles and innumerable addenda and implementation 
regulations is one of the most voluminous legal texts of the entire post 
war period, and which in itself probably is the best proof that by the 
cutting up of Upper Silesia the conditions thus created were completely 
untenable. 
 
 Your Hohers [sic], such were the labors which accompanied the birth 
of the Polish nation. You will understand, I'm sure, that these facts 
were bound to cloud permanently German-Polish relations. Polant's [sic] 
fight against the predominantly German population in Upper Silesia 
continued. It would lead too far even to produce a selection from 
numerous instances of this fight, which lasted more than a decade. 
 
Howeven [sic], as the only example I am going to mention, I would like to 
select the 1930 elections for the Polish Parliament and Senate. In order 
to prevent the German population from demonstrating their true opinion, 
the Warsaw Ministry of the Interior issued a decree according to which 
each voter was at liberty to hand his ballot slip either openly or 
secretly. The decree furthermore stated that those who adhered to a 
secret ballot were to be considered an enemy of the state. Encouraged by 
this decree, the chairman of the District Election Committee for the 
election presinct [c typed over s] III in Kattowicz, issued the following 
written announcement: 
 
"a) On election day, the charrman [i typed over first r] of election 
committees and their associates will appear in the uniform of the 
insurgents.  
 
"b) Eight to ten insurgents will be present in each election room and 
keep the voters under constant observation, watching which kind of ballot 
slip they have in their hands and which slip they are putting into the 
envelope. 
 
"c) Of course, in the election room itself no voter must be molested. 
However, for incidents that might occur out- 
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side the election room, the election commissar will not be responsible.  
 
d) All voters whose slips cannot be checked by the insurgents, will be 
considered an opponent of the Government Party, and will be treated 
accordingly outside the elections room." 
 
A grosser and more pronounced misuse by official authority for falsifying 
election results has hardly ever occurred. 
 
Any person who is familiar with the Polish insurgents association can 
imagine what results these untarnished threats must have had. In this 
election, the Germans lost more than 100,000 votes. It is true that at a 
session of the League of Nations on 21 January 1931 the German complaints 
concerning the November 1930 elections were dealt with. For 45 minutes 
the Japanese Council Delegate Yosichova severely lashed out against and 
condemned the conduct of the Poles. However, no further action resulted 
from this. Liquidation measures of the German rail estate in Poland 
accompanied those terror measures. Hundred of thousands of Germans were 
forced to emigrate.  
 
As early as 27 May 1927, the liquidation commission reported with 
satisfaction that it had liquidated 4,000 rural and 2,000 city estates 
properties, and that it had taken away from the Germans 200,000 hectars 
[sic] of real estate. Such were the conditions when in 1933 Hitler took 
over the responsibility for German policy. 
 
 Hitler's negotiations with the Polish head of State Marshal 
Pilsudski, which were climaxed by the conclusion of the German – Polish 
non-agression [sic] pact of the 26 January 1934, seemed to bring about a 
gradual easing of the tension. However, further developments showed that 
the genuine and straight forward desire of the Marshal, to come to an 
understanding, found no reaction in certain circles of the Polish people. 
Even more pronouncedly after his death in the year 1935 did it seem 
impossible to improve the mutual relations. 
 
 Your Honors: [colon is smudged] I thought it fit to give you this 
brief account 
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in order to show how very strained the relations were at German's Eastern 
borders since 1919. I shall yet submit further evidence in the course of 
my case in chief concerning further developments of German – Polish 
relations in the years prior to Word War II. 
 
Of the operations which, after September 1939, apparently forced one 
country after the other in war, the prosecution has dealt in detail with 
the Norwegian Campaign, as far as its evidence against Admiral Schniewind 
is concerned. 
 
As initial steps to prepare this operation on the part of the Germans 
were taken by an officer of the navy, the former Admiral Carls, and as 
the Navy was predominantly engaged in executing this operation, in 
contrast to the other campaings [sic], I shall yet deal in greater detail 
with the particular topic in my case in chief, I shall prove which facts 
were decisive for the planning, the preparation and execution of this 
operation, and which part of the Admiral Schniewind had in them. 
 
The Western Campaign, the campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece and the 
war with the Soviet Union, will be dealt with by me less specificially 
[sic] because of the subordinate part [space] the Navy played in them. 
25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–1–Hoxsie (Weber) 
Court V,  Case 12 
 
The Prosecution has failed to submit proof for its assertion, that the 
General Admiral Schniewind, participated in war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Therefore, I submitted a motion once before requesting that the 
case against the Admiral in connection with Counts II and III be 
dismissed. The Prosecution holds the following thesis: 
 
a) That this Tribunal, by decree No. 7, is bound to adhere by decisions 
of the   International Military Tribunal, that the acts of invasions and 
war under indictment were actually planned in violation of international 




b) That the defendants, each in his own sphere of duties should have 
opposed the orders and instructions of their supreme commander and head 
of state, and that they should have refused to co-operate in the acts now 
under indictment. 
 
I may assume that it is a practice in all countries and not only in 
Germany that a soldier is obliged to obey implicitly all instructions and 
orders given to him, and that this duty is more binding for im [him] than 
for all other citizens of the state. Any other conduct would 
fundamentally destroy the striking power of all armed forces, which are 
employed to defend and protect effectively the interests of their 
respective countries. 
 
 I think it is an absurd presumption if here the judges of an 
international court, who are meant to pass law impartiall [sic] and 
without prejudice, are to be pinned down by a decree of the American Zone 
Commander to pass a decision, even though this decision contradicts their 
own knowledge and conviction; if, on the other hand, one demands of a 
soldier subsequently that he should have refused to obey the laws of his 
country and the instructions given him by his head of state. In this 
trial, much has been said concerning the evidence submitted by the 
Prosecution. Also, the difficulties of the defense in procuring and 
selecting the necessary documents 
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have been repeatedly dealt with. I do not wish to repeat once more to 
those statements, but I only want to state quite clearly all those facts 
which, additionally, are required and essential in the case of the 
Admiral Schniewind or which are a prerequisite for supplementing my case 
in chief in this case. 
 
 Of 85 documents which the Prosecution has submitted as evidence 
against Admiral Schniewind, 75 documents have been taken form the records 
of the OKM and the war diaries of the Naval war operational staff SKL. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the OKM records and the war diaries of the SKL 
are the only documents which are of any real value as evidence, and they 
are the only documentary evidence which can elucidate events, decisions, 
and actions within the SKL and the reason which caused them. 
 
 Here, the following maxim has been frequently mentioned: "A 
document speaks for itself." I am of the opinions that this maxim can be 
used for many abuses and that it does not always apply. All persons 
conversant with military correspondence of any country– and I believe it 
is similar in the civil service branches – knows that a letter rarely 
stands by itself, but that it is somehow inter-related to a preceeding 
[sic] or subsequent missive. Frequently, preceding documents contain 
requests, orders, or trains of thoughts which are continued in the 
following one or which are replied with it, which does not necessarily 
mean that the initial idea or the reasons are repeated. The author or 
recipient of such letter is often informed about the contacts even by the 
existing situation as a whole. If such a letter is torn from its context, 
and if now it is presented to mean something totally different, 
highlighting a changed istuation [sic], it will frequently become 
misleading and equivocal. 
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 All the documents which have been submitted by the Prosecution have 
been selected from such a collection of records or a bunch of documents, 
more or less dealing with the same subject matter, and in the majority of 
cases this was done without simultaneously submitting either documents in 
the proper context. 
 
 The war diary of the SKL not only contains entries  about events of 
all individual days, reports received and decisions that were passed, but 
also contains numerous attached folders with documents and essays, and 
studies which were the basis for all such decisions. The entire situation 
and the meaning of the individual entries can only be understood if they 
are presented together with such documents. 
 
 Not only am I familiar with the records and war diaries with all 
their [unclear, enclosures?] from my official activity, but I had access 
to them also in 1946 when, commissioned by the defense of Admiral 
Doenitz, I had an opportunity for three weeks to select material for the 
defense from such documents at the Admiralty in London. I know definitely 
that these records and war diaries contain highly important documentary 
material for the defense. Therefore, on the first day of this trial, I 
applied for permission to sift this material and to select all those 
documents which were important for the defense. 
 
 Yesterday, that is almost four months after my first motion, which 
I repeated two months ago, I received informatio[n] to the effect the 
British Administration would not hand over these documents. The fact that 
I have not any foreign currenc[y] prohibits me or a deputy from going to 
London to looks at these document on the spot, and I don't know whether 
attempting to obtain evidence from these documents by other means will 
succeed or not. I would like to state, therefore, that I 
25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–4–Hoxsie (Weber) 
Court V,  Case 12 
 
do not have this decisively important material for my defense. If, as a 
consequence, I should have to submit documents at some points of my case 
in chief, which might appear less suitable as evidence than others, I 
shall refer to this whenever the occasion arises and shall substantiate 
these weak links in my case in chief by testimony of witnesses, who shall 
prove whether and where more suitable documentary evidence could be 
obtained. 
 
 As the Tribunal ordered that, when parts of a document are 
submitted, the defense was to be given access to the entire document, I 
have applied that I received at least the war diaries from which the 
Prosecution has selected individual pages for submission. In this 
connection I would like to mention that a war diary for each individual 
month consists of from 400 to 600 pages. If the Prosecution selects one, 
two, or even three pages from such a war diary to be submitted before the 
court, it is quite impossible that a clarification of each individual 
situation at issue can be obtained from this fraction of material. 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the demand of the defense to receive 
the remaining parts of those particular diaries is quite justified. 
However, I did not receive those war diaries either, and I merely receive 
information that the Prosecution actual y [sic] had only those pages it 
had submitted. Furthermore it was stated that an inquiry in Washington 
proved that those documents were only available as microfilms, which 
could not be handed out, and that copies of the entire war diary could 
not be made because of the considerable amount of the material. Besides, 
it was siad [sic], that this material was classified as secret 
information, and that before it could be handed out, the competent 
authorities would have to have it reclassified. 
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Thus, the Tribunal has only partial material at its disposal for judging 
the case. The defense has been robbed of the opportunity to submit 
supplementary parts of the documents for correction. 
 
 I would like to mention briefly another complication for my case. 
The Tribunal had granted my motion to call the former commander-in-chief 
of the navy, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Raeder, as a witness. As 
former superior of Admiral Schniewind and responsible Chief of SKL, this 
witness would have been in a position to testify exhaustively and 
authoritatively concerning all questions at issue. The Control Council, 
which appears to lend authority to this Tribunal, has refused that the 
witness Raeder be called. Further more, I have also been informed that 
because of certain conditions I could not interrogate this witness in 
Spandau [unclear]. It was left to me to submit questions in wiritng [sic] 
which would be submitted to the witness after approval by the four 
Control Council powers. However, as I have my doubys [sic] that the 
approval of all four powers will be granted before the end of this trial, 
I was forced to ask for additional witnesses, who as former close 
associates of the Chief of the Grand Admiral would be in a position to 
testify on the evidence in question. I would like to request the Tribunal 
not to evaluate any gaps in my case in chief which might occur because of 
this to the detriment of my client. I take up my duties as defense 
counsel for Chief of Naval War Staff Schniewind under the impression that 
the equality of rights for both parties, so often emphasized by the 
Prosecution, does not exist; however, I believe that in spite of it I 
shall succeed to inform the Tribunal of the actual development and 
events. The facts, however, speak for themselves and – I am firmly 
convinced of this – in favor of the Admiral. 
25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–6–Hoxsie (Weber) 
Court V,  Case 12 
 
If the Court will permit me, I will call my first witness, Vice-Admiral 
Haye. 
 
HELMUTH HAYE, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: 
 
THE PRESIDENT" Witness, you will hold up your right hand. 
 
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure 
truth, that I will withhold and add nothing. 
 
(The witness repeated the oath.) 
 




BY DR. MECKEL: 
 
Q Admiral, would you make a pause after each question of mine before you 
answer so that the interpreter can follow you? Please state your full name 
to the Tribunal. 
 
A Helmuth Haye. 
 








Q From what time to what period? 
 
A From the 1st of April, 1914, to the end. 
 




Q When and in what position were you working in the OKM? 
 
A From the winter of 1934 to the winter of '39. 
 
Q [W]hat position? 
 
A As I/A of the Flottenabteilung and later in the Operational Department of 
the SKL. 
 
Q When, for the first time, did the idea of the creation of an SKL emerge? 
 
[....] 
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(The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 26 May 1948.) 
 
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN: If the Court please, I have the photostat now of the 
document introduced before the IMT and the document introduced here.  I 
would like to pass them to the court for inspection. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: You may do so. 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN: Apparently there are two documents with the same number. 
One is a corrected version of this meeting.  The other is another 
captured version which was not corrected.  The one that we have 
introduced in evidence is the uncorrected version.  The one before the 
IMT had hand-written insertions.  I would like to suggest to counsel that 
if he thinks it important he offer in evidence the other version. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Since there are two documents, and since this question 
has arisen, I would suggest that you have the other document translated, 
if it has not been done, and photostated, and that it be introduced and 
reference made back to the other document, And these being the originals, 
if counsel desires to examine on that document, he may use the original, 
of course, for the purpose of his examination here today, and he will 
have the advantage of that and he need not wait for an examination on the 
other copy of this document until it has been translated and 
introduced.  You will see that that is done, will you, Mr. Niedermann? 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN: Very well. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, may I state in conclusion as far as my questions 
were concerned, - it doesn't matter which document is considered.  I have 
merely raised the question because the Prosecution referred to this 
document submitted to the IMT, also with regard to its certification – 
and for that reason I regarded it as being the original document.  There 
is no formal certification as to the authenticity of the other document, 
and it 
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was not quite clear to me up to now that there to different documents 
involved, but I think that this may be regarded as settled for the time 
being, till I have inspected the two documents. 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN:  I might also state for the record, if the court please, 
Dr. Meckel discovered that we had no knowledge that there were two 
documents.  This is the first time since we have been working in Nurnberg 
that we have discovered that there are two versions of L-79, of this 
meeting. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: Well, under those circumstances, I still think the proper 
thing to do, since this question has been raised, is to introduce both of 
these documents, and then there can't be any question about 
it.  Evidently one was a corrected copy and they both may be captured 
documents.  I suppose there is a certificate on all of these documents. 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN: Yes, there is. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: So that they will be admissible under the 
certificate.  Very well, you may go ahead, Dr. Meckel. 
 
OTTO SCHNIEWIND – Resumed 
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION – Continued. 
 
BY DR. MECKEL: 
 
 Q. – We have stopped dealing with the orders in "Fall Weiss", and I 
will now put to you at the next document, Document D-126 from Document 
Book XIII-B, Exhibit 1093, page 303 of the German and 180 of the 
English.  This document contains a time table. Wasn't such a timetable 
also an indication of the imminence of an operation – the document is C-
126. 
 
 A. – No, in no way at all. When one of the services worked out 
orders for a possible operation, then the final item after these 
preliminary considerations is such a timetable.  If all the preliminary 
work has arrived at this state, then the orders which had been elaborated 
can be put away in the drawer, and can be taken from this desk drawer 
when a decision has been made that the orders have to be carried 
out.  Such a timetable does not commit itself to a specified date, but 
starting from an unspeci 
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fied D-day – such a day was called D-Day during the invasion of Normandy 
by the Allied Forces – the last preparations which have yet to be 
initiated are specified for the days proceeding this D-day, if and when 
the order for pperations is given.  That is the coping stone for such an 
order covering a contingency. 
 
 Q. – The next document in supplementary Book XIII, NOKW-2882, Exhi-
bit 1382, page 121 of the German and 57 of the English, is a directive by 
the OKM which regards a modification of Case White,  - Fall Weiss.  This 
communication is signed by you.  What was the reason for this 
communication? 
 
 A. – When the navy, on the strength of the orders issues for Case 
Whie, had to consider how, organizationally, they had to arrange their 
measures in case of war with Poland, the first of all prepared themselves 
for that position which seemed to them most favorable, that is, in this 
case, assuming that on a certain D-day hostilities will break out, then 
the navy will endeavor during the hours of darkness, in the early morning 
of that day, to make the first preparations – first measures, that is, to 
sow mines before the port of Gdynia.  The OKH or the OKW had learned of 
these ideas of the navy.  They had certain anxictics in those quarters 
that by the measures of the navy operational designs of the army might 
possibly be disturbed.  That is, army operations which were only to be 
started upon daybreak.  Thereupon, the navy had to relinquish their 
designs and this order which I have before me issues the appropriate 
instructions for this. 
 
 Q, - Does the wording not clearly reveal that the opening of 
hostileties was to be started by Germany, that is, the war would be 
started by the Germand and one would not wait for the breakout of 
hostilities on the part of Poland? 
 
A. – That cannot be taken from the document without some qualifications. 
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These military orders which were prepared for a possible case of war only 
represent the most favorable solution which we aimed at – the most 
favorable solution  of military operations, whether that could be 
realized in that manner depended ultimately on the military and political 
deveolopments.  For the rest, of course, things were like this.  The 
first step across the boundary r the first shot fired by anyone in a war 
is by no means the proper criterion, for determining as to who started 
the war and as to who is the guilty party.  Perhaps I may remind you in 
this case of a statement by President Roosevelt of the United States, who 
in 1941, when apparently he felt himself to be in a similar position, 
used the metaphor "If during an excursion I see a rattlesnake raising its 
head to assult me, then I do not wait for this rattlesnake to do so, but 
I kill it before." 
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 Q.  In July 1939 the SKL had conferences with the Foreign Office as 
to the manner in which actions were to be taken against Polish Merchant 
shipping.  The Prosecution submitted a document pertaining thereto which 
bears your signature, directed to the German Foreign Office; NOKW 2731, 
Supplementary Book XII, Exhibit 1383, page 125 of the German and page 59 
of the English.  Will you please make brief comments on this 
communication? 
 
 A.  This communication is signed by me.  It represents a 
confirmation of certain conferences previously held by some offices of 
the SKL in the Foreign Office.  I don't know who held these conferences, 
but I assume the Chief of the Operational Department, or the appropriate 
expert in the department.  Regarding the document itself, it shows that 
in the Foreign Office, in accordance  with the implementation order for 
Operation White, measures concerning economic warfare in the Baltic had 
been discussed.  Now regarding this conduct of economic warfare, under 
certain circumstances, political interests were touched upon or were 
involved, and, therefore, an agreement with the Foreign Office had to be 
reached.  The measures provided such as they are recorded in this 
document, are within the framework of international regulations. 
 
 Q.  Were such contacts with the Foreign Office on the part of the 
SKL, were they customary in the SKL? 
 
 A.  Such contacts were actually very infrequent, but in the sphere, 
of course, they had to take place at regular intervals, and they were 
necessary.  This necessity is clearly shown – 
 
 Q.  May I interrupt you, witness.  I believe there was an error in 
the translation.  It was said that this conference took place " at 
regular intervals," in the translation.  Did you say so? 
 
 A.  No. 
 
 Q.  Will you please repeat on what occasions and when such 
conferences and such contacts took place? 
 
 A.  These contacts with the Foreign Office which were very rare, 
were necessary as a rule when such matters, such as economic warfare, or 
measures of Naval Warfare, which touched upon political interests, were 
the 
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subject of discussions.  Such a contact was necessary from a purely 
formal point of view because the information of neutral governments was 
handled by the Foreign Office. 
 
Q  In the next document, that is C-126-E, Exhibit 1092, and NOKW 2196, 
Exhibit 1097, and NOKW 2761, Exhibit 1385, the first two in Document Book 
XIII, and the last document in Supplementary Book XIII. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  What are those three exhibit numbers in their 
order? 
 
 DR. MECKEL: 1092, 1097, and 1385.  The first two are in Document 
Book XIII-B, English page 189 and 199.  The last document in 
Supplementary  Book XIII, English page 67. 
 
 Q  These three documents have reference to the precautionary 
dispatch of U-boats, and of merchant shipping and navel forces in the 
Atlantic.  These measures obviously point to the fact that offensive 
measures in the West were a lso provided for, don't they? 
 
 A  Here again you have a distinction between military offensive 
measures and measures pertaining to aggressive war.  This here concerns 
the fact that in a possible case of war, precautions with respect to the 
enemy had to be made.  That is, that adequate coverage w as secured for 
the contingency that in the case of war with Poland the Western Powers 
might declare war upon us.  They were defensive measures which bore an 
offensive character, because, ultimately, one or two armored pocket 
battle ships and ten or fifteen submarines were unable to conduct an 
aggressive war, but their purpose was, in case of the outbreak of 
hostilities, to relieve our shores – and our home waters – by attracting 
the attention of the enemy forces, and thus they protected areas close to 
home waters.  This actually occurred w hen the "Graf Spec", a pocket 
battleship, in the first months of the war emerged in South Atlantic 
Waters, and tied down numerous British navel craft until it was hunted 
down, and dealt with by them. 
 
 Q  As a supplement to this, could you tell us for how long the 
armored pocket battleship Graf Spee engaged enemy navel  forces? 
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 A  From the outbreak of the war, that is, from the beginning of 
September until the middle of December, I believe, the 14th or 15th of 
December, 1939. 
 
 Q  I now read from Document C-126-E on page 302 of the German and 
page 189 of the English.  It regards operational directive for the 
commitment of Atlantic U-boats, a nd I will read the last 
sentence:  "This directive is to be destroyed if the operations do not 
take place at the latest by the 10 October 1939."  What does it me an, 
and what do you gather from it? 
 
 A  I assume that this is a cover letter which was to accompany the 
operational orders issued to the person in charge of the U-boat 
flotilla.  From the wording which you have just read to me, it can 
clearly be disconcerned that at the time of the issuance of these orders 
one expected that possibly these orders would not be translated into 
action. 
 
 Q  This also merely concerns contingency, doesn't it? 
 
 A  Yes, it does. 
 
 Q  On 22 August, this conference with Hitler on the Obersalzberg, 
which has frequently been mentioned here, took place.  Who in addition to 
you   was present representing the Navy? 
 
 A  I was accompanied by, of course, Grandadmiral Raeder, the 
Commander-in-chief of the Navy.  In a ddition General Admiral Albrecht 
also attended the conference, Admiral Karls, Admiral Boehm, and possibly 
some other naval officers as well. 
 
 Q  Now during this address, or in the course of this address, was 
the conflict with Poland mentioned in such a way that it was said the 
conflict was inevitable and hostilities were imminent? 
 
 A  No, in no way at a ll.  Perhaps I may first refer to the 
testimony which w as made here by Fieldmarshal von Leeb, by General 
Halder, and by General von Sonenstem, who a lso shared the view that the 
conference on 22 August 1939 in no way represented the final and 
irrevocable decision for the start of the war. 
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 Q  Can you in brief sentences reproduce the gist of his address, 
such as you recall it? 
 
 A  this speech as far as its factual contents were concerned, was 
in no way different from the one of 23 May.  Here again Hitler went into 
a great deal of history.  Deference was made to the domestic position in 
Germany.  When however the whole picture of foreign policy, especially 
with respect to Poland, was painted much blacker then it had been 
previously.  As far as I recall it today the sentiments voiced were 
approximately: "Relations with Poland had become intolerable, somehow 
there must be a showdown, and it that was necessary, I Hitler, am of the 
conviction that the Western Powers will not prevent me, particularly not 
now after the pact with Russia had been concluded."  In this conference 
we heard for the first time of the conclusion of a pact with Russia which 
was to take place the next day, or the next day but one. 
 
 Q  Did Hitler in this address mention anything about negotiations 
with Poland? 
 
 A  Yes, one of the concluding lines of thought was to the effect 
that negotiations were being continued. 
 
 Q  You believed then that even after this address by Hitler, in the 
possibility of a peaceful settlement of the tension with Poland, or at 
any rate, you thought it possible? 
 
 A  Yes, quite, but with a certain amount of anxiety, because I 
thought that Hitler might possibly  misjudge the attitude of the Western 
Powers regarding the whole complex.  I looked at matters like this:  If 
the Western Powers in fact are not determined to support Poland to the 
utmost, then Poland will yield, especially, now that the pact with Russia 
has been accomplished.  My anxiety was whether Hitler's assumption as to 
the a ttitude of the Western Powers was actually correct. 
 
 Q  Can you briefly tell us what you mean when you say that Poland 
might then be prepared to give way, in what direction? 
 
 A  In the direction that, A:  that the uncompromising anti-German 
tendency in Poland might change in some way; B:  that negotiations or 
talks 
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about Danzig and the Polish Corridor, which had been unsatisfactory in 
the Spring of 1939, might possibly be resumed.  This unquestionably might 
have formed a basis for a complete change in the relationship between 
Germany and Poland. 
 
 Q  How, after the address at the Obersalzberg, did you talk with 
your Commander-in-chief, Grandadmiral Raeder, concerning this address of 
Hitler? 
 
 A  Yes.  That was at the ar[e]rodrome in Salzburg.  I left for 
Berlin by air from Salzburg with Grandadmiral Raeder, a nd I asked him 
about his impression of the speech. 
 
 Q  What did Grandadmiral Raeder tell you? 
 
 A  Grandadmiral Raeder w as of the view, like myself, that, 
possibly, the a ttitude of the Western Powers as depicted by Hitler, in 
the matters of the settlement of the Polish question, might possibly have 
been misjudged.  For the rest, he w as of the opinion that Hitler in all 
circum-stances would find ways a nd means again to re ach a peaceful 
solution. 
 
 Q  And he explicitly communicated that to you as his own view? 
 
 A  Yes, he did. 
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frankly I don't know that they have much weight. 
 
 MR. NIEDERMAN:  I might add also, that there was considerable 
testimony before both the IMT and here, I believe, concerning the 
accuracy of those notes. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  I was going to state that there has been a good 
deal of testimony here about what took place, and somebody wrote this 
down.  About all the versions, just what took place, and we will have to 
figure it out as best we can.  I think that we will let them stand for 
whatever weight they may have as to what did take place. 
 
BY DR. MECKEL: 
 
 Q  Now, Admiral, when did you realize that there would be a war? 
 
 A  My doubts as to the actual occurrence of war had not been 
removed until finally war broke out.  Particularly, there were doubts 
when suddenly a stop was put to marching orders, which already had been 
issued on 15 August, and at the same time we learned that apparently 
Great Britain and Italy were trying to reach some compromise.  My doubts 
had been finally dissipated when the marching order for 1st of September 
was not rescinded, and the first shots were fired. 
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 Q  Yes. 
 
 A  And he expressed, moreover, that on account of this anxiety 
which he felt, he wanted to talk with Hitler at all costs in order to 
communicate to Hitler his own view regarding the Western Powers, because, 
he himself regarded the position in such a light that without wanting to, 
Hitler might possibly slide into a serious war with the Western Powers. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, in this connection I would like to refer 
to two exhibits submitted by the Prosecution regarding this case.  They 
are typewritten pages which bear no signature, and do not show the 
originator.  At the time, upon presentation of these documents, they are 
Exhibits Nos. 1101 and 1102, it was ruled by the court that these 
documents had not been properly identified, but they would be admitted 
subject to that objection.  I don't know whether a more specific 
identification has taken place on the part of the Prosecution.  The 
ruling was made on 27 February.  Exhibits 1101 and 1102 ; it is Document 
Book XIII.  May I submit two photostatic copies to the Tribunal.  I will 
submit the 2 photostats to the Tribunal right now 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Do you have any idea where they came from, Mr. 
Niedermann? 
 
 MR. NIEDERMAN:  Is it document 798-PS? 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  It is 798-PS. 
 
 MR. NIEDERMAN:  Before the IMT there were two versions of this, in 
fact, there were three versions of the same meaning offered by various 
members of the Prosecution.  These two were admitted, but the third 
version, which was C—3, I believe was denied.  The IMT at the time said 
that they were apparently captured notes, and in the judgment they said 
they were sure that they were authentic, and therefore were admitted in 
evidence.  The IMT judgment, I think, specifically mentioned these two 
documents. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  I think on that subject that they will stand.  They 
were evidently captured documents, or notes of some sort, and so 
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 Q  Was the Navy, in your view, prepared for a conflict with the 
West, that is, a conflict which you and Grand Admiral Raeder thought was 
imminent? 
 
 A  No, in no way at all. 
 
 Q  Can you give the Tribunal a short survey of our naval forces 
with which, on the first of September, 1939, we had to wage war against 
the united naval forces of France and Great Britain? 
 
 A  We started this war with two heavy battleships, with some kind 
of benevolence you might call them battleships – with three armored 
pocket battleships, one heavy cruiser, six light cruisers, approximately 
15 to 20 destroyers, about as many torpedo boats and approximately 35 
submarines of which only ten to 12 were suitable and available for use on 
the high seas.  Now, the British, as far as I recall it at that time 
opposed us with about 15 high-grade battleships, four or five battle 
cruisers, I guess about a dozen heavy cruisers. 
 
 Q  May I interrupt you? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  May I give a statistical chart to the Tribunal which I 
will later present as evidence within the presentation of my case?  It is 
to facilitate the Tribunal's comprehension. 
 
 A  (Continuing)  About 50 to 60 light cruisers – that is what the 
British had --- more than 100 destroyers, 50 to 60 submarines. 
 
 Q  Thank you.  T hat is enough.  Is it true, as the Prosecution 
contended, that the navy entered the war with great enthusiasm and that 
they were   entitled to enter it with great enthusiasm? 
 
 A  No.  On the contrary, we had a heavy heart because   in   view 
of the tasks of war which seemed well nigh impossible of achievement, 
there was no prospect of achieving any decisive successes. 
 
 JUDGE HALE:  May I interrupt?  You didn't mention the naval forces 
of France.  She also had a considerable navy, did she not, Admiral? 
 
 THE WITNESS:  Yes.  France had quite a considerable navy which, by 
itself, was superior to our forces.  France also possessed two or three 
high grade battle cruisers, the Strassbourg of the Dunkirk 
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(Dunkerque) Class, there were battleships of the Richelieu Class in the 
last stages of construction, which were by far superior to our 
battleships.  As to the number of cruisers I can't give you any definite 
figures now.  The French flotilla of destroyers and above all their 
submarine flotilla was substantially larger than ours. 
 
BY DR. MECKEL: 
 
 Q  Now, from the subsequent period the Prosecution has submitted as 
evidence excerpts from SKL war diaries.  I'd like to put a few questions 
to you in order to elucidate the significance of the war diaries, before 
dealing with the further events of the war.  What purpose did the war 
diary serve? 
 
 A  Perhaps I may first make a concluding remark regarding my last 
answer.  Characteristic of the attitude of the navy and of the chief of 
the SKL regarding the war which had now broken out, was a remark which 
Grand Admiral Raeder made when on the day when Britain and France 
declared war on Germany he had a consultation with Hitler.  On this 
occasion he said, "The contribution of the navy in this war will only be 
slight, but the navy will fight and if necessary they will know how to 
perish in honor."  That is just in conclusion of my previous 
statement.  May I ask you now to repeat your question, sir? 
 
 Q  What purpose did the war diary serve? 
 
 A  The war diary was to be used for later historical research.  It 
was to record the course of all the events of the war, and with 
comprehensive appendices and appropriate elucidations it was also to 
record what considerations and what developments prompted certain 
decisions. 
 
 Q  Did the wary diary also contain orders? 
 
 A  No.  the war diary did not contain orders.  For the elucidation 
of events, excerpts from orders were included or attached as appendices 
to the war diary.  The war diary did not consist only of one volume which 
merely described the events, but it contained voluminous appendices about 
all theatres of war, about major events of the war such as 
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Operation Sea Lion, the submarine warfare, the Mediterranean theatre, the 
Atlantic theatre and the individual experts of the SKL furnished the 
person who compiled the war diary with their contributions.  A very 
informative part was formed by the Enclosure D to the wary diary in which 
all incoming intelligence from the Secret Service, from the radio 
monitoring and radio decoding service had been included. 
 
 Q  Can you briefly tell us something about the so-called B Service, 
the so-called decoding service?  What were its tasks and what 
achievements did our decoding service accomplish? 
 
 A  The radio decoding service dealt, as the name suggests, with the 
observation, the monitoring of enemy radio communications.  It recorded 
enemy radio communications and tried to decode intercepted radio 
messages. 
 
 Q  Will you please explain what you mean by decoding? 
 
 A  The military radio service generally – I think I may assume that 
this is well known – does not convey messages by the use of ordinary 
language but it conveys messages in cipher and it is a very special art 
to break the cipher system of the enemy. 
 
 Q  T hank you.  that is enough.  Now, briefly, how far had our 
deciphering service got?  Were we able to read enemy communications? 
 
 A  Until about the middle of 1940 we had an almost exhaustive 
insight into all of the radio communications of France.  By certain codes 
of which we had the key, that were codes in frequent use, we were able to 
almost exhaustively monitor the British radio communications, 
particularly in the fiels of   radio communications between merchant 
ships and we also knew the key to the code used by the British Navy. 
 
 Q  And these reports about decoded communications? 
 
 A  T hey were used in the wary diary as appendices. 
 
 Q  Who wrote the war diary? 
 
 A  Until the beginning of October 1939, an expert in the SKL, whom 
I no longer recall by name, and from October 1939 Assman who either held 
the rank of Kapitaenleutnant or Korvettenkapitaen. 
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 Q  Did this expert write the text of this war diary upon his own 
initiative and under his own responsibility or did he write it upon a 
special order or upon dictation? 
 
 A  This author of the war diary participated in all situation 
conferences held by the commander-in-chief of the navy.  The events which 
he recorded in the war diary, he usually derived from his own information 
but not infrequently, of course, he was ordered to include one statement 
or the other in his war diary. 
 
 Q  Thank you.  How often did you see the war diary and how often 
did you initial it? 
 
 A  I estimate that I saw it once a week, possibly at shorter 
intervals, possibly also at longer intervals, I regularly initialled it. 
 
 Q  Did you ever examine as to whether every word was correct? 
 
 A  In view of the volume of the wary diary and the other claims 
upon me in the SKL that was impossible. 
 
 Q  May I interrupt you?  Can you tell us approximately what volume 
the entries, say, comprised in one week, that is, the interval at which 
you initialled it and looked through it?  Can you tell us the approximate 
volume of one week? 
 
 A  One week probably had about 150 pages. 
 
 Q  Would you like to make any additional comments as to how far you 
examined it? 
 
 A  No.  Of course in this examination  you could only test certain 
samples.  For the rest, the volumes containing the appendices to the war 
diary were not even submitted to me nor was that necessary because the 
more important information was submitted to me when it was received. 
 
 Q  One more question:  T he war diary frequently mentions situation 
conferences with the chief of the SKL, the chief of the 
Soekriegsleitung.  What significance did these situation conferences have 
which were held at the chief of the Soekriegsleitung, that is, at Grand 
Admiral Raeder's? 
 
 A  During the war daily situation conferences took place with the  
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commander-in-chief of the navy.  That was in the morning at ten o'clock 
after the operational department of the SKL had previously screened and 
dealt with all reports which had received during the night.  These 
situation conferences basically formed the foundation for all decisions 
of the commander-in-chief of the navy and only on very few occasions or 
at times of special strain or special operations did special oral reports 
take place with the commander-in-chief in addition to these situation 
conferences.  That was the case during the Bismarck operation, and during 
the Norwegian Operation.  Then it did occur that the commander-in-chief 
was informed every three hours or every five hours or every six hours. 
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Q.  I will now refer to the Norwegian campaign.  How did the preparations 
and plannings for the occupation of Norway  come about?  When did you 
hear of it for the first time? 
 
A. The position in the Scandinavian area had always been followed by us 
with particular vigilance from the very outset of the war because the 
Scandinavian area was of great importance to us, to our economy and our 
war industries, because from Sweden we got most of the ores which we 
needed.  These ores, during the summer months, were shipped to Germany  
via the Baltic Sea; in the winter months when the Bottnian Gulf was 
frozen they were shipped via Narvik, via the North Sea.  This importance 
of Scandinavia for Germany's conduct of the war was, of course, well 
known in the camp of our opponents.  it was a matter of course that we in 
the SKL were very suspicious and paid great attention to the fact that 
these communications to Scandinavia were preserved and were not 
disturbed.  And the first anxieties in this respect already cropped up as 
early as the first month of war when we learned that a special activity 
of the enemy secret service was to be noted in Norway.  Special reasons 
for misgivings were not furnished by these reports as yet but at any rate 
they provided a motive for increased vigilance. 
 
 Q.  What was the reason for the SKL to deal with the case of 
Norway, in theory? 
 
 A. In the first days of October, Grand Admiral Raeder gave me a letter 
from Admiral Karls and at the same time the mission to investigate the 
military angles of the problems which had been touched upon in this 
letter.  I still recall the general tenor of this letter.  Admiral Karls 
had apparently received similar warnings about Norway.  In his letter he 
described the dangers which might result if enemy actions in the 
Scandinavian area might materialize.  A further trend of thought 
contained in this letter was that under certain circumstances one might 
gain possession of certain bases in Norway with Russian help or Russian 
pressure because if we possessed certain bases in Norway, then our 
opponent would be unable to obtain possession of Norway.  Admiral Raeder 
gave me the mission to 
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study this question in the SKL as to whether in fact the possession of 
any bases in Norway would be of military profit to us and this 
examination took place in the SKL. 
 
 Q.  Were those the considerations which you found in the record of 
the war diary of the 3 October?  I refer to the Document which the 
Prosecution used as C-122, Exhibit 1117, Book XIV, on Page 86 of the 
German and 37 of the English.  (Document handed to witness.)  Do you 
recall this entry? 
 
 A. Of course I no longer recalled the entry as such, but when I saw 
it again here all the connections became clear to me once again.  It says 
excerpt from the war diary, that Grand Admiral Raeder, the Chief of the 
SKL, thought it necessary to familiarize Hitler, as soon as possible, 
with the considerations about the Scandinavian and the Norwegian 
area.  This is followed by certain questions, for which illustrations are 
given, as to what places in Norway might be considered as strong points, 
and so forth. 
 
 Q.  Admiral, that is quite enough.  It is all contained in the 
document.  Now, how do you account for the fact that in this entry the 
anxiety that Britain might intervene in Norway is not raised in this 
document, but merely the question of bases is touched upon? 
 
 A. In the war diary of course the topic is only treated in as far 
as Admiral Raeder had given a specific order.  That is the military angle 
of this problem. 
 
 Q.  But you recall with certainty that at this time the premise 
that was started from was that Britain might possibly gain a footing in 
the area.  That is what you stated   before, wasn't it? 
 
 A. There is no doubt about it.  This anxiety about Britain was the 
mainspring of everything. 
 
 Q.  General, in this connection I will submit evidence within the 
course of my presentation, the affidavit of the former Kapitan Zur See 
Assmann, who at that time compiled the war diary of one SKL and was 
present at the conference.  It is SKL 302 which I will offer at a later 
stage. 
 
 You said before that from other sources too you had received 
information 
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about an imminent invasion of Norway, from agents.  Now, from what 
sources did you derive this information and from whom? 
 
A.  In addition to the sources which I named, the direct reports by 
agents directed to Admiral Karls, we also received warnings which were 
channeled to us from Admiral Canaris foreign intelligence office, and 
Grand Admiral Raeder was particularly cautious here because the same 
warnings were received from two different sources. 
 
Q.  Now, what was the attitude of the SKL regarding this idea, the 
occupation of Norway or the securing of bases in Norway.  Was it regarded 
as advantageous or was it regarded as disadvantageous?  What was their 
position? 
 
A.  The view of the SKL was to this effect:  Of course, through a seizing 
of certain bases in Norway certain profits might be derived but in the 
first place these profits, looking at them from the military point of 
view, were rather problematical, but other considerations led to the fact 
that an action in Norway was not considered by us as being merely 
advantageous but that it might also imply grave dangers, because if we 
were entrenched in Norway then it was a matter of course that Norway was 
no longer neutral for our enemy.  Norway would become a theatre of war, 
and in view of the superiority of the British naval forces it was to be 
expected that the trade traffic along the Norwegian coast would very soon 
be stopped if we were lodged in Norway. 
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 Therefore, the SKL arrived at the final result that the best 
solution would be if there remained as they were at the outbreak of war, 
that is, that Norway  was to remain neutral and that this neutrality, of 
course, had to be strictly respected by both parties making due allowance 
for the rules of neutrality which had been established by Norway. 
 
 Q.  Will you briefly tell us what those Norwegian rules for 
neutrality were? 
 
 A. The Norwegian rules for the Norwegian neutrality were in 
conformity with the customary rules for neutrality for Naval warfare, 
largely speaking, and in the angles which are of interest here, it 
provided that both parties were to be allowed to call a trade traffic in 
the territorial waters of Norway, the peaceful passage through Norwegian 
territorial waters of Norway, the peaceful passage through Norwegian 
territorial waters was to be open to warships and to auxiliary war 
vessels and to ships flying the Reichsdienstflagge.  Radio communication 
was prohibited in Norwegian territorial waters. 
 
 Q.  May I interrupt you.  I think there was a misunderstanding 
here.  You said ships flying the Reichsdienstflagge, but the translation 
“auxiliary vessels” was adequate and already covered this point.  Will 
you please explain what the term ships flying the Reichsdienstflagge 
connotes?  
 
 A. I believe that the term warship is known.  In addition to 
warships every nation in war also has former merchant shipping which was 
reconverted into warshipping, and among them were for instance auxiliary 
cruisers.  In addition every navy also had for instance certain supply 
vessels which did not fly the war ensign but a special flag which 
designated their nationality.  I don't know how matters were handled in 
the American Navy but I can illustrate it by citing the British 
Navy.  The British Navy war flag is the white ensign and the British 
commercial flag in the red ensign, and the Reichadienstflagge of England 
is the blue ensign, this, the service emblem of the British 
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ships and thus we also had a service emblem analogous to the British blue 
ensign, that is the Reichsdienstflagge. 
 
 Q.  Can you name a ship which played a part in the Norwegian 
problem which would come under that category? 
 
 A.  I thought it was necessary to clarify this question quite 
unequivocably.  It was the vessel Altmark which in the middle of February 
was raided by British warships in Norwegian territorial waters bore the 
German Reich service ensign, the Reichsdienstflagge. 
 
 Q.  You have just described the position taken by the SKL regarding 
the idea of Admiral Karls, concerning  a counter measure in Norway.  You 
have made clear the position of the SKL.  Now what happened afterwards? 
 
 A. The SKL or the personnel office by order of the Chief of the SKL 
sent a Naval attaché to our Legation in Oslo  so that from there he might 
be in a position to observe clearly the development of the situation and 
convey the news of it to us. 
 
 Q.  Who was this navel attaché? 
 
 A.  Korvettenkapitaan Schreiber was the naval attaché. 
 
 Q.  Your Honor, in the scope of my presentation I will submit an 
affidavit by this Naval Attaché.  Therefore, I will not go into details 
at this stage.  The opinion of the SKL was submitted to the Chief of the 
SKL and what steps did he take? 
 
 A.  The Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy still thought this 
matter important enough to have it reported to Hitler because this was 
not merely a military question or a question of war industry and armament 
but if ever one had to expect the contingency of Britain lodging herself 
in Norway then much graver results might ensue.  Britain in Norway  mean 
that the whole country would be used and was available as a basis for the 
British conduct of war; that the routes through the Kattegat and 
Skaggerak were blocked to us and one might even consider it quite 
possible that even the other part of the Scandinavian peninsula, that is 
Sweden, might at some stage pass into the British Orbit, 
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either it might be that one supply from the eastern coast of Sweden would 
be denied to us or that Sweden might join the Western powers which meant 
the revival of war in the Baltic Sea but in a much more aggravated manner 
that we had had it at the outbreak of war, and in the view of the Chief 
of the SKL this might mean losing the war.  For that reason Grand Admiral 
Raeder thought it necessary to inform the Fuehrer about these 
connections. 
 
 Q.  Were you present when this oral report was made? 
 
 A.  No, the report was made by Grand Admiral Raeder alone. 
 
 Q.  Do you know the substance of this oral report? 
 
 A.  Grand Admiral Raeder, - he informed me later about this, - 
during his oral report closely adhered to the memorandum of the SKL which 
had been made upon his order regarding these matters which culminated in 
the conclusions that they were dangerous, and military advantages would 
be slight; that even if we were in  Norway one could not predict with 100 
per cent certainty that trade communications with Norway could be 
sustained. 
 
 Q.  Your Honor, I will submit to the Tribunal in this connection, 
the documents SKL 308 and 303, one is a war diary entry about these 
events.  The second an affidavit of the then Naval Adjutant to Hitler, 
Frigattenkapitaen von Putkarmer.  Did Grand Admiral Raeder tell you about 
Hitler's reaction and his view on these questions? 
 
 A.  Yes, on the next day he informed me and the experts of the SKL 
about it during the situation conference; he said that Hitler had been 
much impressed but the subject matter had been completely strange to him; 
a decision had not been made; Hitler had stated that he would have to 
think this matter over. 
 
 Q.  Were these questions further dealt with in the SKL or was there 
an interruption in dealing with these matters? 
 
 A.  In the SKL subsequently nothing happened at first and this 
matter remained in abeyance inasmuch as nothing was done on our part, but 
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news warnings continuously reached us from the agents. 
 
 Q.  You already said they came via agents.  Were there other 
sources too? 
 
 A.  Yes, from the Naval Attaché we had in Oslo and to whom I have 
already referred and a revival of this whole problem occurred in the 
first half of December when the Norwegian politician  Quisling  appeared 
on the scene. 
 
 Q.  When was that? 
 
 A.  That must have been in the first third-about the 10th of 
December. 
 
 Q.  Were you present during the conversations of Quisling with 
Grand Admiral Raeder? 
 
 A.  No, I was not present but I learned that Quisling had been 
introduced to Grand Admiral Raeder by Rosenberg and that Quisling 
afterwards in talking to Grand Admiral Raeder gave a similar dangerous 
account of the position such as we had previously received as the result 
of the news from agents. 
 
 Q.  Did you ever come into contact with Quisling? 
 
 A.  Not at that time. 
 
 Q.  At another point of time? 
 
 A.  In the summer of 1932 I once, as expert of the Fleet Staff 
(Hottenstab) was in Oslo on board the flagship and at that time the 
officers of this ship were his guests because he was the War Minister of 
Norway at the time. 
 
 Q.  In the documents a certain Hagelin is also mentioned.  Did you 
hear of him? 
 
 A.  No, I think I only learned his name in connection with the 
trials.  I have never seen him nor spoken to him. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  At this time we will take a recess for fifteen 
minutes. 
 
 (A recess was taken.)   
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THE MARSHAL:  The Tribunal is again in session.            BY DR. MECKEL: 
 
Mr. President, I would like to submit a chart for the information of the 
Tribunal because this chart is not quite adequate for the treatment of 
the Norwegian problem. 
 
Q.  Admiral, before the recess we talked about Quisling's visit to Grand 
Admiral Raeder.  In the Indictment it is asserted that you were in touch 
with and kept in touch with Quisling.  What can you tell us about that? 
 
A.  I neither had personal contact nor did I keep up such contact with 
Quisling. 
 
Q.  The Prosecution further asserts that at that time you were in very 
close touch with General Warlimont of the OKW, is that correct? 
 
A.  As far as I can recollect, I had never any official or private 
contact with General Warlimont.  That not only refers to this particular 
question – I had not contact with him at all. 
 
Q. Do you know what Grand Admiral Raeder initiated after Quisling's 
visit? 
 
A.  Raeder regarded Quisling's news as being significant enough to 
necessitate a contact between Quisling and Hitler, so that Quisling could 
tell Hitler personally his ideas and worries. 
 
Q. When did that happen? 
 
A.  That must have been on either the 11th or the 12th or the 13th of 
December, 1939; that meeting must have taken place on one of these days.  
 
Q. Do you know what Raeder's view was of Quisling and his statements? 
 
A.  The information which Quisling brought to us was quite consistent 
with other information sources.  It was significant, of course, and 
interesting that now, completely separated from all former channels of 
information, a Norwegian politician transmitted the same type of news. 
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I know, however, that Grand Admiral Raeder told Hitler at the time, and 
that was before Quisling visited him, that one had to be rather careful, 
in evaluating Quisling's statements and news.  Quisling after all was a 
politician  and a Norwegian party functionary.  One would never be quite 
sure whether or not with such information he wanted to further personal 
or party aims. 
 
Q.  On that occasion did Raeder once again talk about the whole problem 
of Norway  to Hitler? 
 
A.  Yes.  He once again summarized the whole problem and spoke to Hitler 
about it.  He talked very clearly and objectively about the advantages 
and the dangers. 
 
Q.  What dangers? 
 
A.  Dangers inasmuch that in the event of the seizure or the occupying of 
Norway  by England, our situation would become extremely dangerous.  For 
the rest that even if we occupied certain bases the situation need not be 
satisfactory.  The situation after all was this:  If the British were in 
Norway, it was certain that we would not get any ore from Norway.  No, if 
we were in Norway it would mean that for a certain period, either a 
longer or shorter period, we would possibly get some ore.  If none of the 
two parties was in Norway, and, if Norway were to remain neutral, then it 
was quite certain that we would get ore. 
 
Q.  Do you know whether after Raeder's report in December Hitler took any 
steps? 
 
A.  No.  Hitler at that time decided to take charge  of the whole problem 
of Norway himself and to deal with all questions connected with this 
problem with a special working staff which was to be subordinated to him 
personally. 
 
Q.  Did you in the SKL gain knowledge of this work which was to be 
carried out by this special staff? 
 
A.  We did not receive any current information; for quite sometime we 
didn't know anything at all.  I know that at the end of 1939 and the 
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beginning of 1940 on Raeder's request, I once again made an exhaustive 
study about the whole Norwegian problem and this study was transmitted to 
the OKW and it possibly ended up in this working staff which was 
especially created for this purpose. 
 
Q.  But you cannot give any detailed information about the work that went 
on in the OKW? 
 
A.  No.  I am not informed about that. 
 
Q.  It's asserted in the Indictment that in the SKL a working staff was 
created as well, under your direction.  What can you tell us about that? 
 
A.  That is not correct.  The study which I mentioned just now was dealt 
with by the responsible experts in the normal course of business 
routine.  There was no special working staff for Norwegian matters. 
 
Q.  According to the available information, the Study North of the OKW 
was received by your office on the 10thoif January, 1940.  What 
considerations were expressed in this study? 
 
A.  This study, as far as I can say today in retrospect, was an 
exposition of the whole Norwegian problem, approximately along the same 
lines as it was regarded by the SKL.  Dangers, advantages and 
disadvantages of an occupation were discussed. 
 
Q.  Now, what developments occurred later? 
 
A.  Towards the middle or end of January, Hitler and the OKW, at least 
those subordinated to him, must have created the Working Staff Norway  or 
North, whatever it was called; and, this working staff consisted of 
members of all branches of the services; a naval officer was also a 
member of the staff.  That was Captain Kranke.             DR. 
MECKEL:  Mr. President, I am going to submit to the Tribunal an affidavit 
executed by one naval Captain Kranke, SKL No. 301. 
 
 Q.  Was any other work carried out in the SKL that concerned the 
Norwegian plans or any plans concerned with Norway? 
 
 A.  In the SKL nothing further was initiated or dealt with in this  
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Q.  Did you have any contact with Captain Kranke? 
 
A.  A connection with the OKW Norwegian staff and the SKL was of course 
given because of Capt. Kranke being the liaison; in order to carry out 
his task he needed certain information which the SKL could give him, as 
for instance, if an operation resulted, how many ships would be 
available; what ships, how many soldiers could be accommodated, etc. 
 
Q.  On whose initiative was the Norwegian matter expedited? 
 
A.  I have no exhaustive knowledge of this, but according to all the 
impressions which Captain Kranke transmitted at the time, apparently 
Hitler was the instigating factor in the Norwegian matter after he 
realized the significance of the Norwegian problem. 
 
Q.  Did Hitler later on consult Grand Admiral Raeder in any way? 
 
A.  Yes.  As far as I know, Grand Admiral Raeder visited Hitler several 
times during the subsequent period. 
 
Q.  Were you present during these discussions? 
 
A.  No, I wasn't. 
 
Q.  What opinion did Raeder express to Hitler during these discussions? 
 
A.  For all practical purposes it was always the same opinion which 
Raeder expressed to Hitler.  He wanted to prevent Hitler being too one-
sidely optimistic in reference to this whole matter. 
 
Q.  Thank you; that suffices.            DR. MECKEL:  I shall submit to 
the Tribunal a memorandum about an oral report by Raeder to Hitler in 
February, 1940.  That will be part of my evidence. 
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Q.  In the meantime, did any events occur which might indicate either a 
violation of neutrality on the part of Norway or an imminent intervention 
on the part of England? 
 
A.  Both occurred.  More and more news arrived concerning activities of 
French and British agents in Norway, and, during the whole of the time, 
since the beginning of the war, almost since the beginning of the war, 
or, at any rate since the ore traffic to Germany had to be channeled via 
Narvik, that must have been since approximately the middle of November, 
1939, there was a constant series of British transgressions into 
Norwegian sovereign waters, directed against German shipping.  One thus 
gained the impression that on the part of the Norwegians not sufficient 
energetic action was put up against this British behavior.  This 
culminated in the incident of the tanker Altmark which has just been 
mentioned. 
 
Q.  Will you briefly describe for us the Altmark incident? 
 
A.  This tanker Altmark was an auxiliary vessel of the battleship Admiral 
Graf Spee.  When the Graf Spee was sunk in the southern Atlantic, in the 
middle of December, the tanker Altmark was called back to Germany.  The 
ship succeeded in taking the northern route between Denmark, and reaching 
the Arctic Sea and to reach Norwegian territorial waters near Tronhjem. 
 
Q.  Could you give us the route again? 
 
A.  The ship succeeded in coming from the southern Atlantic, passing into 
the North Atlantic Sea between Iceland and Greenland, and reaching the 
Norwegian coast near Trondhjem, where she was in Norwegian territorial 
waters.  In the Norwegian territorial waters it directed its course 
towards the south:  the ship bore the Reichadionstflagge, equivalent of 
the British blue onsign flown by auxiliary naval vessels.  Apparently 
some news about the passage of this ship was transmitted to English; that 
might very easily have happened through code communications; with the 
result that when the ship loft the Norwegian territorial waters near 
Stavanger, south of Berge, constant touch was kept with this tanker 
Altmark, first of all by planes and later by British destroyers.  These 
followed the tanker,  
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first of all keeping outside the territorial waters. 
 
Q.  May I interrupt.  The tankers was outside the territorial waters -- 
or where? 
 
A.  The tanker moved within the territorial waters, but the British 
destroyers followed the course of the tanker moving, for the time being, 
outside the territorial waters.  During the further trip south, the 
British destroyers clearly approached the tanker, and, not disturbed by 
the presence of two small Norwegian torpedo boats, attempted to press the 
tanker Altmark outside the Norwegian territorial waters.  In that 
situation the tanker Altmark took refuge in the Gjoorsing Fjord on the 
southern coast of Norway.  Again, without taking notice of the Norwegian 
torpedo boats, one of the British destroyers followed the tanker Altmark 
into the Fjord, and send armed crows on board the tanker.  Members of the 
German civilian crews went overboard and, I may say in this connection 
that the Fjord was frozon; and, the members of the crew who went 
overboard tried to escape over the ice.  They were shot at.  Seven of the 
members of the crew who were trying to escape were killed.  After the 
British destroyer had liberated the prisoners who were on board the 
tanker Altmark, (they originated from the Graf Spee battleship,) the 
British destroyer left.  There can be no question that that was a plain 
breach of neutrality. 
 
Q.  And when did this take place? 
 
A.  That was the middle of February, 1940. 
 
Q.  What was the attitude of the Norwegian Government to this incident? 
 
A.  As a whole, I believe the Norwegian government maintained the same 
attitude as we did, and a strong protest was lodged on the part of the 
Norwegian government to England.            DR. MECKEL:  Mr. President, 
in this connection I am going to submit Document SKL-315 which contains 
the attitude of the Norwegian Foreign Minister about the Altmark 
incident; further, Document SKL-316, an excerpt from the war diary which 
deals with the Altmark affair. 
 
Q.  Do you know what impression our diplomatic representatives gained   
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in Oslo about the resistance of the Norwegian Government? 
 
A.  Our representatives in Oslo expressed their attitude to the following 
effect:  Norway would not be capable or at any rate not willing to 
maintain its neutrality. 
 
Q.  Could you repeat the last sentence? 
 
A.  Our representatives in Oslo expressed their opinion to the effect 
that the Norwegian Government apparently was not capable or willing 
effectively to protect and defend Norway's neutrality. 
 
Q.   Therefore did you gain knowledge of any other breaches of 
neutrality?  
 
A.  Around the period of time which I mentioned earlier, from the middle 
of November until February and March, of the next year, there was a 
series of breaches of neutrality. 
 
MR. DOBBS :  If Your Honors please, I don't quite see just to what extent 
certain breaches of neutrality would affect the actions of the SKL or of 
the German navy -- not confining it to my particular department -- would 
have after these certain other plans had gone through on the part of the 
navy.  These were subsequent actions.             DR. MECKEL:  Mr. 
President, I believe -- 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Well, the Tribunal is of the view that those plans hadn't 
culminated until action was taken, and, while the Tribunal would like to 
have him be as brief as possible, why the objection, we think, is not 
good.  It's overruled.            BYDR. MECKEL: 
 
 No further comments are necessary about this problem.  I shall 
submit evidence concerning it. 
 
Q.  When was the preparatory work of the so-called working staff North in 
the OKW transformed into a concrete order? 
 
A.  In the first days of March, from the working Staff North, there 
arrived the first operational directive; I believe that is what it was 
called.   
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 Q.  Did this directive contain – I beg your pardon.  Another 
question first.  What was this directive called? 
 
 A.  I believe in that directive it was expressed for the first time 
in writing that Wesermunde was to be the code name of an operation 
directed against Scandinavia; if such an operation would come about. 
 
 Q.  Did that directive contain a introductory reasoning? 
 
 A.  Here again there was a preamble, a notation, approximately to 
the effect that the situation might necessitate certain measures to be 
taken in Scandinavia. 
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Q  Was this directive already an order for attack, or did it just mention 
preparations, or what was it? 
 
A   It was not yet an order.  It was merely a preparatory expression of 
certain measures which would be taken.   
 
Q   What were the missions of the navy in this directive? 
 
A   The navy had been assigned the task, according to this directive, to 
secure entry into the intended landing localities and to make sure that 
the necessary occupation troops would be transported to these areas. 
 
Q   How did the navy regard the execution of this mission? 
 
A   The navy was of the opinion that such an operation directed towards 
the north, particularly towards Trondhjem and Narvik  would be connected 
with considerable risks.  T he long flank march very near the British 
coast could, in view of the strength of the British naval power, easily 
lead to serious setbacks. 
 
Q   In this particular direction of the OKW there is some mention of the 
occupation of Denmark.  Now, from whom did the idea originate?   
 
A   The SKL was very surprised at the inclusion of the occupation of 
Denmark in the order.  A necessity of such an action could not be 
understood by the SKL and also by Grand Admiral Raeder, at least, not in 
accordance with the original ideas.  Later on I learned that the 
inclusion of an occupation of Denmark into these plans was to be traced 
back to requests of the air force.  This branch of the service held the 
opinion that bases in Denmark could not be done without if the operation 
Norway had to be carried out. 
 
Q   After these directives were received, did the SKL voice any 
misgivings against the execution of this plan, and, if so, for what 
reason? 
 
A  The opinions within the SKL were from the very beginning until the end 
always somewhat divided.  This was the case because many of the 
responsible experts were of the opinion that the risks of such a 
commitment were not in a proper proportion to the prospects or success. 
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Q  Admiral, I will now pass to you an excerpt from the war diary of the 
SKL, that is, Document NOKW-2265, Document Book XLV, Exhibit 1124, page 
130 of the German text, and page 60 of the English text.  These are 
entries about a situation conference with the chief of the SKL, and the 
date is the second and the fourth of March 1940.  What is revealed in 
these entries. 
 
A  The substance of this entry is that apparently the SKL or the man who 
initiated the entry held the view that all military problems and worries, 
etc., strategic matters are at stake.  The misgivings which had been 
voiced up until then, particularly with respect to the military risk, 
would now have to recede into the background. 
 
Q  Who was commissioned by Hitler to carry out the Norwegian operation? 
 
A  The man in charge of the working staff was General von 
Falkonhorst.  He was also to be in charge of the operation if it became 
necessary. 
 
Q  Did you receive the operational order from Falkenhorst? 
 
A  Yes, it came into one possession. 
 
Q  When? 
 
A  Approximately on the 5th of March. 
 
Q  What did the SKL initiate in accordance with the Fuehrer directive? 
 
A  On the basis of this Fuehrer directive and of this operational order, 
-- “Wesermuende”.  The SKL gave the corresponding directives to the 
subordinate agencies of the navy. 
 
Q  Did at that time the SKL receive any information from radio 
reconnaissance, and if so, what type of information? 
 
A  Radio reconnaissance was a very good source of information, and it was 
particularly valuable because it rendered a very objective confirmation 
of news which had originated from other sources, and with regard to which 
news one might have held some doubts at one time or another.  This radio 
monitoring service, particularly in the Norwegian matter, 
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confirmed that some kind of the movements from the British coast, 
northern Scottish ports, were being planned and prepared. 
 
Q  Do you happen to know of any designations of these plans from this 
radio service?   
 
A  Yes, particularly the British code names “Havenforth” and “Stratford” 
have remained in my memory.  Those were the code names of the forces 
which were to go to Norway, and the subtitles of “Stratford” were A, B, 
C, D, and those designated the objectives which were to be reached by 
certain groups within these forces. 
 
Q  Where was this information collected that came in about such matters? 
 
A  Finally after having passed through certain agencies which had to be 
informed, they were collected as enclosures to the war diary. 
 
Q  Now, this particular fact, the “Stratford” and “Havenforth” plans 
which you just mentioned, was that later confirmed in any other manner? 
 
A  After the execution of the Norwegian operation had started, and after 
skirmishes had taken place with the British troops, which had already 
landed, we found in the possession of the landed troops heaps of 
documents which gave a clear confirmation of the fact that the 
information transmitted by agents, as well as the radio information had 
been correct with reference to the misgivings which the SKL had had. 
 
Q  Did you yourself see these captured orders which you have just 
mentioned?   
 
A  Yes, I saw them myself.            DR. MECKEL:  If the Tribunal 
please, I shall submit these captured orders in evidence, as well as an 
excerpt from the war diary which makes reference to these captured 
orders.  They are contained in Document Book III of the defense for 
Schiewind.  Unfortunately, I am not able to get the information from the 
decoding because that is contained in that part of the war diary which is 
not available to me. 
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About the fact that this information was available from the coding 
service, I am going to submit an affidavit from Captain Assmann. 
 
BY DR. MECKEL: 
 
 Q  Now, to the best of your knowledge of the situation, what was 
the situation at the time when the order for the occupation of Norway of 
the 9th of April was issued – did you think that an intervention of the 
part of England was imminent? 
 
 A  Here I have to make a rather lengthy statement because at the 
time immediately before the occupation of Norway the situation 
varied.  Until the first half of the month of March, approximately the 
5th or the 10th of March the picture had been completely clear to us.  We 
knew that intentions to land would very shortly be realized, and 
according to the picture of the situation which we had, these intentions 
were to be carried out under the pretext of aid for Finland. 
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 Finland at that time was engaged in a war with 
Russia.  Approximately around the 10th or 15th of March an armistice was 
concluded between Finland and Russia, and that meant that this pretext 
could no longer be used for a landing in Norway by the British or by the 
French.  Prior to this time the tension had already become so acute that 
Hitler urged the immediate carrying-out of the Norwegian 
operation.  That, however, had somewhat abated, but already during the 
last ten days of March, the activity of the enemy increased again.  The 
picture gained by the radio monitoring service showed alarming 
proportions, and rendered the impression that an operation on the part of 
the British and French against Norway was imminent.  The activity of 
agents had of course never abated throughout the whole month of March. 
 
 Q.  What measures of the enemy became externally apparent which 
supplemented this picture? 
 
 A.  During the first days of March a mine operation by the British 
took place in Norwegian territorial waters. 
 
 Q.  I beg your pardon, when was that? 
 
 A.  During the first days of April. 
 
 Q.  Well, I believe you said March? 
 
 A.  I correct myself, during the first days of April the British 
carried out a mine operation in Norwegian territorial waters, which in 
the opinion of the SKL was clearly directed against pressing peaceful 
merchant navy traffic out of territorial waters, thus making it 
accessible to British forces.  on the whole we regarded this however as 
tactical preparatory act as against further outstanding measures. 
 
 Q.  At that time our movements had already started, hadn't they? 
 
 A.  At the time when the mine operation took place, our operations 
had already started from the home ports. 
 
 Q.  Therefore, this mine operation can no longer be regarded as 
having been the cause for our operations? 
 
 A.  No. 
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 Q.  Subsequently did you receive any further confirmation of the 
fact that this British intervention had actually been imminent at the 
time? 
 
 A.  After the Western campaign we also found in the French archives 
a large number of documents which dealt with this Norwegian 
operation.  In addition, during the course of the Norwegian operation 
itself, it became evident that apparently a British operation, while our 
operation had started, was also already in progress.  Otherwise, it would 
not have been possible that on the afternoon of our arrival in Nolrvik 
that the British destroyers had already been located outside the Lofoten 
Fjord; otherwise, no fighting contact could have been established between 
our battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, and the British battle 
cruisers which were also in the Lofoten area. 
 
 Q.  At the time were you under the impression that it was a 
justified preventive measure? 
 
 A.  Yes, I had that impression at that time, and even today it is 
my opinion that this operation was militarily necessary and justified. 
 
 Q.  May I ask you, in conclusion, to tell us very briefly in what 
phases of this operation the SKL participated? 
 
 A.  There can be no doubt that the whole Norwegian problem was 
first of all taken up by the SKL and was recognized in the SKL in its 
whole significance, and, subsequently brought to Hitler's attention for 
the first time.  That, however, was the nature of the whole matter, 
because something that was concerned with transporting across the sea 
would necessarily fall under the responsibility of the SKL.  In addition 
it is correct that the first discussion between Quisling and a German 
representative took place, that is, between Quisling and the Chief of 
Staff of the SKL, and that the latter brought Quisling to Hitler. 
 
 Q.  A little briefer, please? 
 
 A.  Finally in the last stage, the SKL put into implementation the 
operational directives which were given by Hitler in the order 
Wesermunde. 
 
 Q.  This brings me to the preparation for the campaign in the 
West.  In this connection the Indictment said that through the so-called 
key 
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conferences on 23 May, and 2 August 1939, you were informed of the fact 
that Hitler intended not to observe the neutrality of Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  That is in paragraph 17 and 18 of the Indictment.  Now, is 
this assertion correct? 
 
A.  I should like to refer to the testimony of the Chief of General Staff 
of the German Army, General Halder, who has testified before this court 
about this problem.  About your question on the conference of 23 May, in 
my opinion there can be no doubt that certain intentions about war in the 
West, possibly already connected with decisions, intentions, 
implementation and matters of execution, were not discussed.  In the same 
way I am certain that this also refers to 22 August, where such 
intentions and discussions would not have fitted into the tenor of the 
conference, because during that conference Hitler designated the idea of 
a warlike conflict in the West as non-existent.   
 
Q.  According to the entries of the War Diary of the SKL at the beginning 
of October 1939, you had a discussion with General Halder, Chief of Staff 
of the German Army.  Do you remember the discussion? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  What was the substance of this discussion? 
 
A.  At that time during the first days of October I went to see General 
Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, in order to find out from him 
whether he saw any possibilities for giving the Navy a more favorable 
operational base against England.  As the most advantageous objective, I 
designated Normandy at that time, or even better, Brest in Britany.  The 
Chief of Staff of the German Army rejected such ideas, or threads of 
thought as Utopia, and said that one could not expect anything like such 
an operation, and that he saw no opportunity for the carrying out of such 
an operation, and even less, the possibility of achieving such 
objectives.   
 
Q.  In this discussion was the question of the occupation of Belgium and 
Holland mentioned? 
 
A.  I didn't touch upon this question.  General Halder touched upon it 
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in a very cursory manner, inasmuch as he said, "Even if one could 
visualize the carrying out of an operation against France perhaps through 
Belgium and Holland, even then with that kind of objective which you 
mentioned, Normandy and Brittany would remain a Utopia."  I for my part 
didn't touch upon this matter at all, because we in the reaching at the 
Belgium-Dutch Frontier we saw no improvement for a Naval operational 
base, as the First World War had shown. 
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 Q  This discussion took place after the war with England and France 
had broken out? 
 
 A  Yes, it took place in the first days of October and England and 
France had declared war on us on the 3rd of September 1939. 
 
 Q  What was your reason for discussing this objective Brest, 
Brittany and Normandy? 
 
 A  The Polish campaign had come to an end.  Now all attention of 
the Wehrmacht, and thus also of the navy, was directed more strongly 
towards naval warfare, towards a war against England.  I saw the picture 
as follows:  Perhaps with the releasing of the forces from Poland there 
was now a possibility of marching into France by breaking through the 
Maginot Line. 
 
 Q  Were you particularly interested with your suggestion in 
suggesting an operation against France or what was your basic idea?  What 
was the aim of your inquiry? 
 
 A  In my aims it was very clearly defined what I wanted.  I wanted 
to reach Normandy-Brittany and I did not think of a route other than via 
the immediate frontier Germany-France. 
 
 Q  What was the interest of the navy in reaching Brest and 
Normandy? 
 
 A  It would have been a more favorable operational base for our 
naval warfare directed against England. 
 
 Q  Were other possibilities discussed, bases for naval warfare and 
how to achieve such bases? 
 
 A  In the discussion with the Chief of Staff of the German army I 
also touched upon the Norwegian problem and asked him how he visualized 
an operation of the German army against Norway.  He rejected such an 
operation completely.  The impetus for this question of mine was 
undoubtedly given by the letter of Admiral Karls which I had just 
received during the first days of October. 
 
 Q  At that time did you know the memorandum and the directives 
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about the conduct of the war in the West?  That is Document L-52, Exhibit 
1146, Document Book XV-A, Page 88 of the German and Page 51 of the 
English text.  (Document handed to witness.) 
 
 A  I saw this memorandum for the first time here in Nurnberg. 
 
 Q  Do you remember Directive No. 6 for the conduct of war, dated 9 
October?  This is Document C-62, Exhibit 1145, Document Book XV-A, Page 
48 of the English text and Page 80 of the German text. 
 
 A  I could no longer remember this Directive No. 6.  However, I had 
an opportunity to read it here once again and now I know all about it 
again. 
 
 Q  It is stated there, and I quote, "Amongst others the purpose is 
to gain as much Belgian, Dutch and Northern French area as possible as a 
bases for an intended naval war against. England."  Is that consistent 
with the opinion held by the SKL? 
 
 A  No, it is not consistent with the opinion held by the SKL. 
 
 Q  Why not? 
 
 A  The SKL could not do very much with bases along the Dutch and 
Belgian coast. 
 
 MR. MECKEL:  If Your Honors please, at this point I should like to 
refer to Document SKL-403 which I am going to submit later and which 
contains this attitude of the SKL which the Admiral just mentioned and in 
the document it is entered in the war diary, and it is stated there that 
the SKL is not interested in bases in Holland and Belgian. 
 
 Q  Did the navy participate in preparatory plans and considerations 
which formed the basis of this directive No. 6? 
 
 A  No; otherwise the sentence which you just quoted in this order 
would not have been included. 
 
 Q  What tasks were allotted to the navy according to this 
directive? 
 
 A  As far as I recall I beg your pardon.  It is expressed here in 
Paragraph 5:  "The SKL has to make every effort in order to support 
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the operations of the army and the air force directly or indirectly 
during the course of this operation."  Such possibilities of supporting 
the other two branches of the service were not envisaged by the SKL. 
 
 Q  In this directive the possibility is also considered that the 
Western powers might invade Belgium? 
 
 A  Yes, that contingency is also expressed in the directive.  In 
addition there were also indications that such a course might be taken by 
the Western Powers. 
 
 Q  In this connection may I submit Document NOKW-2078 contained in 
Document Book XV-A, Exhibit 1150, Page 198 of the German and 112 of the 
English text.  It says there:  "New directive of the Fuehrer.  In the 
course of Operation West, it has possibly to be expected that the Western 
powers will disregard Belgian and Dutch neutrality."  Have you found that 
place?  Do you know on what that attitude is based? 
 
 A  Exactly and authentically I can, of course, not give you the 
reason for the inclusion of this indication in the Fuehrer's Directive; 
but I have some clues.  We in the SKL had a liaison officer of the German 
army through whom we generally are informed of the attitudes and measures 
of the German army and of the General Staff, to the extent to which this 
lisison [sic] officer was authorized to communicate such opinions to 
us.  Through this man we learned that the General Staff held the opinion 
that the manner of the French deployment along the Belgian-French 
frontier was directed towards a possibility of attack on the part of the 
British and the French through Belgian territory against our Western 
frontiers.  There was the additional factor that one-sided troop 
concentrations of the Belgians along the Belgian-German frontier had been 
reported.  Information from agents stated similar facts and, finally, - 
and that was a decisive factor which showed us something about the idea 
of neutrality on the part of the Belgians and the Dutch, the opinion 
which prevailed in England and France.  I believe I am not wrong in 
stating that in the months between September and  
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March approximately 100 protests were lodged on the part of the Germans 
to Belgium and Holland because of the British and French aircraft – 
probably more British than French aircraft – flying over Belgian and 
Dutch territory. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  If Your Honors please, may I suggest, because I have 
reached the end of a certain chapter now, that we conclude the session 
for today? 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  We will take a recess until nine-thirty tomorrow 
morning. 
 
 (The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 hours, 27 May 1948.) 
[....] 
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     THE PRESIDENT:  Any redirect? 
 
     DR. MECKE [sic]:  No question in redirect. 
 
     THE PRESIDENT:  You may stand aside, then. 
 
     DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, I will have any further witnesses for the 
time being, and thus I have arrived at the end of my presentation in the 
case of Schniewind except for the presentation of 
evidence.  Unfortunately I cannot do this now as the document books have 
not bee [sic] mimeographed in time as I had expected they would be.  I 
believe they were not served on the Prosecution in good time, and I would 
ask the Tribunal, therefore, that I may submit them at a later stage. 
 
     MR. NIEDERMANN:  We have no objection if he desires to put them in 
now; we have Document Books I, II and III. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  You say you have no objection? 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN:  We have no objection. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  To their being put in at this time you mean? 
 
MR. NIEDERMANN:  That is correct, Books I, II and III.        
 
DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, these documents are originals; they are 
certified excerpts from books which I hope I will be able to file with 
the Secretary General at a later stage.  Of course the originals could be 
submitted at once. 
 
     THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, I take it you do not now have the 
photostats; is that correct? 
 
     DR. MECKEL:  Yes. 
 
     MR. DOBBS:  If it please the Tribunal, rather than have me interrupt 
Dr. Meckel during his presentation I would like at this time to make two 
requests.  One, that in instances where excerpts of a book are being 
offered, the Prosecution would like to be furnished the complete book; in 
other words, the excerpts taken as part of the book, we would like to see 
the full book.  And two, we of course reserve the right to cross examine 
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any witnesses whose affidavits are being submitted. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, it is understood generally that that 
privilege of cross examination exists throughout the trial, and, it is 
understood that as fast as these books are prepared by Counsel and ready, 
that they will be turned over to the Prosecution, even though they may be 
admitted zt [sic] a later time.  I mention that for the benefit of any 
counsel. 
 
 JUDGE HALE:  My understanding of Mr. Dobbs' request was where 
extracts from some book on navy warfare or history are submitted that you 
request Counsel to submit the entire book for your examination so that if 
in studying it, you find anything that weakens or contradicts or adds to 
the extract submitted, that you may also have the privilege of submitting 
that.  That was your request? 
 
 MR. DOBBS:  That is correct. 
 
 JUDGE HALE:  You have no objection to that, have you, Doctor? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  I am able to comply with the request except for one 
case.  I have used excerpts from a Swedish white book, and I have not got 
a copy of this Swedish white book.  It's the property of a library for 
international law in the city of Kiel.  I tried to get ahold of it but 
iunfortunately [sic] I couldn't get it, but, I think that hold good the 
other way around; you have the documents which are lodged with the 
British at your disposal. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, if you do the best you can, we will meet that 
when we come to it.  Now, before you begin, may I just for the record, a 
document in Document Book I, as I understand, you presented it the other 
day as Exhibit No. 1 which was admitted; the photostat that appears on 
page 1 of your document book. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  The photostat has not yet been inserted, but is to 
be inserted; and then on page 2, the one you describe as Document 112, 
that 
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was admitted this morning as Exhibit No. 2. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  And now the rest of them are ready to take up? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  You may proceed. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document I offer is an affidavit of Admiral 
Buerkner who reports on the political information of the SKL through the 
Department Ausland Abwehr, that is the foreign intelligence department in 
the OKW.  This is SKL 102, on page 5 of the document book.  It is offered 
as Schniewind Exhibit No. 3. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, just a moment.  What about this one appearing 
on page 3; aren't you going to offer that? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor, it was just a mistake. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, the one on page 3 should be marked 
Exhibit No. 3. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Yes. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  All right. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  As Exhibit 3; I offer SKL-114 to be Exhibit 3.  It's 
an entry of the war diary of the SKL with appendices.It's [sic] compiled 
from records and from memory of Admiral Schniewind in order to give a 
short survey as to the extent of records available. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  The document will be admitted. 
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 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-113; it's an excerpt from the 
book Nauticus, 1939, edition; a comparison of the strength of Britain, 
France and Germany.  A statistical representation on these figures was 
put to the Tribunal in the course of my direct examination.  This is 
offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 5.  
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, just a moment. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  It's on page 7. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, what are you doing with the affidavit on page 
5? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  I beg your pardon; I had mentioned it before, but I 
will repeat what I said. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, you want the affidavit on page 5 admitted as 
Exhibit 5? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.  I beg your pardon. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  It will be admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-113, which I just referred 
to, will be Schniewind Exhibit No. 5. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-103, is an excerpt from the 
book a report of the American High Command and contains a report by 
Admiral King, the former commander in chief of the American Navy and 
chief of the operational staff of the U.S. Navy.  This excerpt shows the 
opinion of the Admiral regarding the tasks of the navy and the resultant 
necessity of armament.  I will submit this document as a reply to exhibit 
1023 of the Prosecution and 1444, as a rebuttal to the Prosecution 
exhibits. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Those numbers again, please -- 10 -- 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  1023 and 1444. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  I particularly point out the first paragraph of this 
excerpt and the following sentence which reads: "in peace time our 
security 
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measures are determined among other things by the actions of those states 
which are hostile to the United States and which, rightfully or 
wrongfully believe that they can take up the fight with us."  And, the 
last sentence of this paragraph I quote: "The exact strength of the navy 
which the navy needs to fulfill its task can only be ascertained with 
great difficulty." 
 
 JUDGE HALE:  Dr. do you think it is necessary to make those 
quotations in presenting this?  We can read and we will have to read 
these documents. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Very well.  I would merely ask your permission to 
point out the salient points, but I will confine myself to a 
minimum.  This will be Schniewind Exhibit No. 6. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-107, likewise was taken from 
the report by Admiral King.  I want to show by submitting this that in 
1938 other navies also rearmed, including the American Navy, which has 
been arming since 1933 in view of an inevitable struggle.  With this last 
term I refer to Exhibit 1444 of the Prosecution in Which [sic] a similar 
term of a threatened conflict with Great Britain is referred to; and, I 
offer it as Exhibit Schniewind No. 7. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-101, is an affidavit of the 
former Admiral Konrad Albrecht.  It describes the danger of enemy attacks 
on Germany in the 1920's [sic], and the relations with Poland, and, it 
refers to the study Ost.  I offer this document as Schniewind Exhibit No. 
8. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-104, is a report taken from the 
report by General George Marshall about the time from July to June, 
1943.  By submitting this document I wish to establish that even in the 
view of General Marshall in a tense situation the view of the political 
situation must 
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not have any influence upon measures of the soldiers.  I will not cite 
the pertinent passages. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  This is Exhibit No. 9. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Exhibit No. 9. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-105, is likewise taken from the 
report; it's an ecerpt [sic] from the report of General Marshall.  I will 
submit it as a rebuttal to the citations in the indictment in connection 
with the armament plans.  It is mentioned that a readiness for a war 
without having any preliminary time for starting it is called for.  A 
similar remark is contained in this document here that the units ought to 
be ready on the very shortest notice to be ready for battle.  This I 
offer as Schniewind Exhibit No. 10. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted.  
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-106, is an excerpt from the report by General 
Arnold, who was the commanding general of the Army Air Forces of the 
United States.  He reports that thirty-five operation plans had been 
completed for the event of war.  He is of the opinion that an offensive 
is the best defense; and, he further calls for long-range bombers for an 
attack before the enemy is in a position to counter.  I offer this as 
Schniewind Exhibit No. 11. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 MR. DOBBS:  I believe I heard the translation come through a 
thirty-fi [sic] plans, 35 Operational plans -- 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  in 1935; correction; that should have been in 
1935.  It's offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 11. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-109, which shows the opinion of the world press 
after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, to which Schniewind 
yesterday referred in the course of his direct examination.  I offer it 
as Schniewind Exhibit No. 12. 
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 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-110, is a continuation of these 
opinions on the next day, and is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 13. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Document Book II deals with the Polish campaign and it shows 
how this development was represented to the outside world, especially to 
Admiral Schniewind.  The first document deals with the relationship 
between Poland and Germany from 1920 to 1931; the first document, SKL-201 
is an affidavit by the former Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth about the 
Polish attempt in 1920 and 1922 to sever forcibly parts of the German 
territories, and continued unrest special fear against Poland in 1930-
1931.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 14. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  It's admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document I offer was submitted in the Krupp 
trial.  It's an affidavit by General Adam; it describes an imminent 
Polish attack in 1931 and German defensive measures in those years.  It's 
Krupp Document 103, and, it's offered by me as Schniewind Exhibit No. 15. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  What page is that on? 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Page 4. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  It's offered as 15? 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Yes, 15, Your Honor. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is Krupp 133, an affidavit by Kurt Grael 
the former deputy in the Polish parliament.  It describes the steadily 
mounting tension caused by Polish measures and he reports about his 
impression of Polish offensive plans, Polish plans of aggression.  It's 
offered as Schniweind Exhibit No. 16. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next documents deal with the German and Polish relati 
from 1933 until 1939, to May, 1939.  They are taken from the German white 
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book; they are all reports of German consular representatives, of 
ambassadors, envoys. 
 
 SKL-202 is a report from 1936, to be Schniewind Exhibit No. 17. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  It's admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-203 is a report from November, 1936, to be 
Schniewind Exhibit No. 18. 
 
 SKL-204 is a report from November, 1937, to be Exhibit No. 19. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Wait just a minute.  The one on page 11 is 18? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  That is admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next one is SKL-204. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Wait a minute; the next one is 202 that I have. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-203 is on page 11, your Honor. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  All right; on page 12 what are you doing with that 
one? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  That is SKL-204, that is on page 12 and is offered as 
Exhibit Schniewind 19. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  The document 204, on page 12, will be admitted as 
Exhibit 19. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, I think it's quitting time. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  I hadn't noticed, but, I think it is.  We will be 
in recess for fifteen minutes. 
 
(A recess was taken.) 
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 THE MARSHAL:  The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
 DR. GRUENEWALD (Attorney for the defendant Lehmann):  Your Honor, I 
would ask that the defendant Lehmann be excused from attending the 
sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday morning in order to prepare his case. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  He may be excused.  The record will so show. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-205, a communication to the 
Foreigh Office, dated the 5th of November, 1938.  It emanates from the 
Reichminister of the Interior and speaks about the Polish De-
Germanization measures in the Teschen area which led to the flight of the 
German population to Germany.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 20. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-206, a telegram of the German 
Ambassador in Warsaw to the German Foreign Office, dated 24 May 1939, 
about the mobilization of reservists in Poland, offered as Schniewind 
Exhibit 21. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-207, on page 15, is a telegram of the German 
Ambassador at Warsaw to the Foreign Office.  It reports about military 
circles gaining increasing influence on Polish Foreign Police.  It is 
offered as Schniewind Exhibit 22. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-208 gives an account of Polish mobilization 
measures in the northern part of Poland on the 25th of March, 1939.  It 
is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 23. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-209 is an account of an Anti-German demonstration 
in Bromberg, on the 26th of March, 1939, with shouts of "We want 
Dantzig", "We want Koenigsberg", offered as Schniewind Exhibit 24. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-210, a report dated the 13th of April, 1939, about 
anti-German riots at Pomerellen, is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 25. 
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 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-211 is a report of the German Charge d'Affaires in 
Warsaw, dated the 20th of May, about a stiffening of attitude against 
Germany.  Press demands Dantzig must become Polish.  This is offered as 
Schniewind Exhibit 26. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKE:: [sic]  SKL-212, report by the German Consul General in Thorn, 
dated the 15th of May, 1939, about the transfer of troops to Dantzig and 
recall of troops from furlough -- 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  It is admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  This is Exhibit 28, Schniewind 28. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Into this period falls the speech of Hitler before the 
Reichstag on the 23d of May on which SKL-215 records the statement of 
Field Marshal von Brauchitsch before the International Military Tribunal, 
which is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 29. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The following documents show the development from May 
until August 1939.  SKL-216 is a compilation of quotations from leading 
Polish papers and statements by leading Polish politians [sic], for 
instance, such as that "Poland must be united inseparably with East 
Prussia".  "The Vistula Estuary is the living space of the Polish 
nation."  "War with Germany is inevitable.  Victory at Berlin will crown 
it," and other such statements.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 
30. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-217 is a report by the German Ambassador, dated 5 
July 1939 about the education of the German ethnic group in the 
ecclesiastical field."  [sic] It is submitted as Exhibit No. 31. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
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 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-218 is a report by the German ambassador in Warsaw 
about an interview with an official of the Polish Foreign Office about 
the persecution of the Germans and the minority questions.  It is offered 
as Schniewind Exhibit 32. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-219, report by the German Consul in Thorn, about 
the excesses in the period from 5 to 20 July 1939, is offered as 
Schniewind Exhibit No. 33. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-220, a report by a Belgium Deputy about his 
impressions from a visit in Poland, reprinted in the Voelkischer 
Beobachter in its issued [sic] of 5 August 1939, is offered as Schniewind 
Exhibit 33. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-221 is an excerpt from a Polish newspaper, in 
Thorn, dated 8 August 1938 -- I beg your pardon, it is reprinted in the 
Voelkischer Beobachter, dated 8 August 1939, and a quotation from it is, 
"We shall expell [sic] the Germans from East Prussia and Silesia, beyond 
the present frontier."  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 235. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-225 is a record of the Foreign Office, and a 
compilation of serious cases of persecutions of Germans in Poland, 
offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 36. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is an affidavit by the former Admiral 
Erich Foerste.  It was submitted before the IMT as Affidavit 3114 in the 
trial of the OKW.  The author at that time was commander of one of the 
two German battleships, that was the battleship Gneisenau which in July 
1939 sailed in Atlantic waters without being equipped with the necessary 
munitions for fighting in case of war.  It is offered as Exhibit 37. 
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THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next affidavit is a statement by a former Vice-
Admiral.  He reports about the way in which Admiral Raeder in the summer 
of 1939 informed higher naval officers about the situation and he assued 
[sic] these officers that no warlike conflicts were to be expected in the 
next few years.  This affidavit is also taken from the evidence submitted 
to the IMT.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 38. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  In this period, we also have the address of Hitler in 
Obersalzberg on the 22d [sic] of August and I submit SKL-226, the 
statement of Grand Admiral Raeder before the IMT about the contents of 
this address.  This is submitted as Schniewind Exhibit No. 39. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-227 is the testimony of Field Marshall von 
Bruchtisch also about this address of Hitler in which he states that 
Hitler had emphasized the negotiations with Poland would be 
continued.  This is submitted as Exhibit Schniewind 40. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
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 DR. MECKEL:  SKL 234 is also taken from the evidence submitted to 
the IMT.  That is from the evidence of the defense of Grand Admiral 
Raeder.  This is an affidzvit [sic] by the former Grand Admiral Boehm, 
and contains as an appendix a record which this Admiral made directly 
after conferences in accordance with notes which he made during the 
conferences.  This record was taken a few minutes after the conferences, 
and in my view it representsthe [sic] only record of probative value 
regarding this conference.  It is well known who made it.  It has been 
stated when it was recorded.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 
41. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL 229 gives an account of the shooting of German 
aircraft outside of Polish territory on 23 and 24 August, and is offered 
as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 42. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 Q.  The next document is SKL 230.  I'll have to make an 
interruption.  I don't know whether SKL 230 is contained in the English 
Document Book.  I don't want to submit SKL 230.  The next document I wish 
to submit is SKL 231. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, 230 appears in this book. 
 
 DR. BECKEL [sic]:  That is right. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  You are not submitting that. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  No, Your Honor.  The next document is SKL 231, on page 
90.  It is a statement by the Swedish witness, Dahlerus, before the 
IMT.  It is an account of the attitude of the Polish Ambassador on 31 
August 1939, and records the statement, "That he was not interested in 
discussing thenote [sic] with the German Government and who stated that 
in case of war the Polish Army would march in triumph in Berlin."  This 
is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 43. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 233.  It is an excerpt from a 
speech by President [sic] on "Freedom of the Seas" and is offered as 
Schniewind's Exhibit No. 44. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
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MR. DOBBS:  With respect to this last document, I specifically request 
that there be offered the whole test of his speech. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Very well, you have that, do you, Dr. Meckel? 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, this excerpt which is contained in here is taken 
from the book which was submitted as evidence before the IMT.  This book 
contains likewise only excerpts from speeches of President Roosevelt, 
which were selected not by a German agency, but by some American agency, 
and disseminated in Germany after the war, and it is available. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Well, if you have the source from which you took it, that 
is the thing to submit to the Prosecution. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  That is the source, yes, YourHonor [sic].  I now turn to 
Document Book III, which contains the antecedents of the occupation of 
Norway according to German documents.  That is, according to the records 
which at the time were available and formed the records for a picture 
which Admiral Achniewind [sic] had at the time.  
 
The first document is SKL 304.  The testimony of Grand Admiral Erich 
Raeder before the IMT relating to the events which led up to the Norway 
campaign.  I offer that as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 45. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is an affidavit of a former Captain 
Assmann of the German Navy.  This officer in the first months of the war 
compiled the war diary of the SKL, and he was present at all conferences 
held in the SKL.  I submit document SKL 302 as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 
46. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 303.  It is an affidavit of the 
former Rear Admiral von Puttkamer, who at the time was the Naval Adjutant 
to Hitler.  He reports about an oral report by Raeder at Hitlers on 10 
Octoberand [sic] the fact that during this time this is the first time 
the Norwegian operation was mentioned, and the anxiety the British might 
land in Norway, which was the reasons for taking up this idea.  It is 
offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 47. 
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THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 306, an excerpt from the War Diary 
of the SKL, containing entry of 4 October, which states that the English 
consulates in Norway were reinforced and partly filled with English Navy 
officers.  That is one of the few records contained in the War Diary with 
extracts about news from Norway at the time.  It is offered as 
Schniewind's Exhibit No. 48. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 308.  It is likewise an excerpt 
from the War Diary of the SKL, and gives an account of the visits of the 
former Norwegian Minister of War Quisling which he paid to the commander 
of the Navy, and is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 49.  I may add 
that in this entry it is pointed out here, that in another part of the 
War Diary, that is, in Part C, Book II and Book VII, that further records 
were contained in these parts. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 340, an affidavit by former 
Lieutenant Commander, Richard Schrieber, who at the time was German Naval 
Attaché in Oslo.  This officer was mentioned by Admiral Schniewind during 
his examination, and he himself now reports about the intelligence which 
he received.  SKL 340 is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 50. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 309, which is an excerpt from a 
collection of documents on the Law of Naval Warfare.  It is a collection 
of documents which at the time were compiled and edited by the OKM and is 
now contained in the archives of the International Military 
Tribunal.  The excerpt as produced here deals with the intervention of 
the British Navy and Air Forces in the Norwegian territorial waters in 
November and December 1939, and in January 1940.  I offer this excerpt as 
Schniewind's Exhibit No. 51. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
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 DR. MECKEL:  Document SKL 310 is an excerpt from the War Diary of 
SKL.  It is pointed out that "Studie North" has been received and news 
about the intensification of British Warfare, I offer that as 
Schniewind's Exhibit No. 52. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL 307 is likewise an excerpt from the War Diary of 
the SKL, and you will find there misgivings by the SKL with respect to 
the Norway Operation, and their position with respect to the maintenance 
of the present state or status quo was the most favorable solution.  This 
is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 53. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  SKL 341 is likewise an excerpt from the War Diary with 
information about British political and propaganda pressure on 
Norway.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 54. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted.  Do you have a further comment? 
 
DR. MECKEL:  No, Your Honor. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is an affidavit by Admiral Theodor 
Krancke, who was at the time a member of the special staff Norway to the 
OKW.  Admiral Krancke reports about the meeting of this staff, about 
their assignments, about the conditions under which he worked and what 
was to take place at the time and how the tasks were dealt with 
specifically.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 55. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
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 DR. MECKEL:  Document SKL 312, an excerpt from the Diary of General 
Halder submitted as Prosecution's Exhibit No. 1340.  The excerpt here 
produced was not translated in the English version, which was prepared by 
the Prosecution, and that is why it is submitted here.  The entry shows 
that the air forces prompted the occupation of Denmark.  That was at the 
end of February 1940.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 56. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Document SKL 315 is likewise an excerpt from the 
previously mentioned collection of documents on Naval Law, which is also 
in the archives of IMT.  Those documents related to "Altmark Case".  This 
"Altmark Case" according to testimony of Admiral Schniewind was an 
essential point in appraising the position.  I submit the delcaration 
[sic] by the Norwegian Foreign Minister in this case, and the statement 
by the British Prime Minister and the Norwegian Foreign Minister with 
respect to the appraisal on the International Law in this case.  It is 
offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 57. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  It is admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKE [sic]:  The next document is C-100.  It is an excerpt 
from the Minutes of the oral report of the Commander-in-chief of the Navy 
to Hitler on 23 February 1940, in which he discussed the different 
possibilities of solving the Norwegian question and the position of the 
Navy which was well known was represented to the effect that it was most 
favorable for Norway to remain neutral.  It is offered as Schniewind's 
Exhibit No. 58. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKE [sic]:  SKL 316 is also an excerpt from the War Diary of SKL, 
dated 4 March, which mentioned the preparation for defense on the part of 
Norway, and the facilities for defending Norway against possible British 
intervention.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 59. 
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 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKE [sic]:  SKL 321 also is an excerpt from the War Diary of 
SKL which points to an imminent action against Norway, and is offered as 
Schniewind's Exhibit No. 60. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKE [sic]:  SKL 317 is a compilation which was made at the 
time at the SKL about the violation of neutrality by British Naval Forces 
in Norwegian Territorial waters, and in this tabulation they are to make 
clear that the violations of neutrality, or disregard on the part of the 
British of the neutrality was continued, and in fact, even 
intensified.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 61. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 318.  That is likewise taken 
from a collection of documents on the law of Naval Warfare, and describes 
some very drastic cases of British intervention in the Norwegian 
Territorial Waters.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 62. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL 322 is an entry from the War Diary of SKL, dated 
27 March 1940 -- SKL 382, a report from Norway of imminent British 
action.  This note points to the current file "Weseruebung" War Diary, 
which is contained in the same excerpt.  It is offered as Schniewind's 
Exhibit No. 63. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Just a moment.  Is that SKL 382 or 322. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  It is 322, Your Honor. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 323, an excerpt from the War Diary 
of SKL, dated 8 April, giving an account of the laying of mines in 
Norwegian Territorial Waters, which were referred to yesterday on direct 
examination.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 64. 
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 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 324, and it is an entry in 
the War Diary of SKL, and gives an account of the capture of British 
Operational Orders.  In this case that was under the Stratford Plan, with 
respect to landing operations in Norway.  I would like to remind you that 
the term "Stratford Plan" and its objective was known to the SKL as early 
as March, because they had broken the code of the British Radio 
communication, as was testified to yesterday by the witness.  The 
captured order was attached to the appendices of the War Diary.  This is 
offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 65. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next series of documents deal with the antecedent of the 
occupation of Norway according to British, French and Swedish 
documents.  At the time of the preparation of the Norwegian operations, 
these documents were not as yet in German hands.  They did, however, in 
the course of the war fall into German hands, and by submitting them I 
wish to establish, or to make clear that even during the course of the 
war incoming information confirmed the justification of this operation, 
and, of course, gives the attitude of the SKL, including that of Admiral 
Schniewind, regarding subsequently received information, and other 
designs which might not have been overlooked at the time. 
 
The first document is an excerpt from the White Book, which has now been 
published in Sweden.  It also is based on the submitted documents, and it 
shows an account on the neutral country and of the events as they are 
seen now.  I want to submit it in connection with the report which Grand 
Admiral Raeder made in his testimony before the IMT, a certified German 
translation of the Swedish White Book, the original of which is contained 
in the Institute of International Law in the City of Kiel. 
 
It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 66. 
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 THE PRESIDENT:  What page is that, please. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Page 72 and page 76. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  It is admitted.  
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 325, taken from the German 
White Book, which is contained in the Evidence Library in the Palace of 
Justice, and deals with the reconnaissance orders of the British 
Admiralty of December 1939, which are along the same lines for an 
appraisal of the necessity of gaining air bases, which are reflected in 
the diaries of the SKL, and which has been submitted by the 
Prosecution.  This record is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 67. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
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DR. MECKEL:  SKL-326 is an espionage order of the British Admiralty, 
dated 31 January 1939, directed to the British Consul in Narvik.  It is 
offered as Schniewind Exhibit 68. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  SKL-327, a letter of the British Naval Attache in Stockholm 
who, just as the German attache', was included in those espionage orders 
of his country.  It is directed to the British Consul in Narvik, dated 
February 1940, about further additional espionage orders.  It is offered 
as Schniewind Exhibit 69. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  What is the document you are talking about? 
 
DR. MECKEL:  SKL-327 on page 83.  Perhaps I have been too fast.  I 
mentioned a further espionage order directed to the British Consul in 
Narvik, dated January, on page 82.  It was offered by me as Exhibit 68. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Just a moment.  Going back to 325 on page 77, am I right 
that that is 67? 
 
DR. MECKEL:  Yes. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  And then the next one is on page 79? 
 
JUDGE HALE:  82. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  According to the German it is on page 82. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  I beg your pardon.  I got it in the wrong place.  Now, 69 
is on page -- 
 
DR. MECKEL:  83. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  I have it now.  69 is admitted. 
 
DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-328, on page 85, is taken from the 
secret files of the French General Staff.  It is a telegram of the French 
Prime Minister Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, dated January 
1940.  Daladier in this telegram urges the expansion of the military and 
maritime activities in Scandinavia.  In this telegram Daladier expresses 
his opinion that every pretext which might permit the gaining of 
influence on the war situation ought to be fully 
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exploited.  This document is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 70. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-328, on page 87, also emanates 
from the secret files of the French General Staff.  It is a communication 
from the French Prime Minister, Daladier, to the French Ambassador in 
London, dated February 1940.  It concerns the intervention in Norway, the 
main objective of which, as is stated in the document, is to cut off 
Germany from her ore supplies. 
 
 Your Honor, I see that there is an error here.  This document bears 
the same document number as the preceding document.  Your Honor, may I 
suggest that it be received with the same exhibit number as the preceding 
document 328; that this document be appended to Exhibit 70? 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Very well. 
 
 JUDGE HALE:  Why not just call it 328a? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor, certainly. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  That will be better, I think, 328a. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  And it will then become Schneiwind Exhibit 71. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Yes, and as such it will be admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-335, likewise taken from the secret files of the 
French General Staff, are notes of the French Commander-in-Chief, General 
Gamelin.  They report that since the 16th of January the landings of 
allied troops had been planned.  The main target was the ore mines in 
Northern Sweden.  At the same time Gamelin suggests an operation in the 
Balkans in order to intensify the economic throttling of Germany.  I 
offer this document as Schneiwind Exhibit 72. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-329 is likewise taken from the secret files of the 
French General staff.  It is a report on the negotiations of the 
Scandinavian Commission of 11 March.  I point to the first sentence of 
the second paragraph, that the issue was not to effect a forcible 
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landing but to demonstrate power.  This to me seems to be an instance 
that the military pressure was note merely haunting the minds of 
Germans.  I offer this document as Schneiwind Exhibit 73. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The next Document is SKL-337.  It is an excerpt from 
the Swedish White Book which I mentioned previously.  It indicates the 
diplomatic preparations of the British and the handing over of an aide-
memoire to the government of Sweden.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 
74. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-336, an excerpt, is likewise taken from the 
Swedish White Book.  It shows the resolutions of the sixth meeting of the 
Supreme Council l, dated 26 March 1940.  The same document is also 
contained in the German White Book.  It was t aken [sic] from the 
captured files of the French General Staff.  This is offered as 
Schniewind Exhibit 75. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-331, likewise from the secret files of the French 
General Staff, is a telegram of the French Military attache in London to 
General Gamelin, which indicates the time limits for this landing had 
already been fixed, which was to take place approximately at the same 
time as the German landing actually took place.  It is offered as 
Schniewind Exhibit 76. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-330, on page 108, is an excerpt from British 
operational orders for the preparation of the occupation of the North 
Swedish ore mines from Narvik.  It shows that the preparations on that 
side were not only confirmed to Narvik but that they also extended to 
Swedish territory.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 77. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
28 May 48-M-DC-11-4-Goldberg (Weber) 
Court 5, Case 12 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  SKL-332, likewise from the secret files of the French 
General Staff, is a communication of the Supreme Commander of the French 
Navy, Admiral Darlan, to Daladier, which was drafted immediately after 
the German occupation of Norway.  It indicates that Admiral Darlan was of 
the opinion that the German High Command was bound to know the enemy's 
decisions because Darlan didn't think much of the discretion observed at 
the conference.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit 78. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  The last document, SKL-333, is the minutes of the 
meeting of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940.  This document 
reveals that German Naval forces were being shipped and so camouflaged on 
merchant shipping that they were not detected by the British Intelligence 
Service.  Moreover, the question of possible operations on the Balkans is 
to be examined.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 79. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  I then have finished presenting my documents in Books 
I to III.  The next documents can be presented when the document books 
have been served on the Prosecution and I would like to be able to do 
this at a later stage. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  You may have that privilege.  You have done a very 
good job of putting in 79 documents; with a pretty long statement as to 
each one you have done that in a very short time.  Now, that is all that 
you have with respect to your case that you are able to present 
today?  You are through except for the documents? 
 
 DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.  I will conclude my case today for 
the time being. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT:  General von Roques' case is next.  Is there a 
representative of General von Roques present?  You may just be 
seated.  If counsel for General von Roques will come into chambers and 
some representative of the Prosecution for just a few minutes we will 
talk 
